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REMEMBERING THE CREDITOR AT DEATH:
ALIGNING PROBATE AND NONPROBATE
TRANSFERS
Elaine H. Gagliardi*
Editors' Synopsis: As more people choose to avoid the cost and time
involved with probate administration by using nonprobate transfers,
creditors of decedents face increased procedural challenges and practi-
cal difficulties in collecting debts. In this Article, the author proposes
legislative reforms that would unify the creditor claims procedure for
probate and nonprobate transfers when beneficiaries are unwilling to
pay claims. The author argues that a more unified claims procedure
would still allow efficient passage of property at death and would
encourage fair treatment of all beneficiaries and creditors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Decedent's creditors face procedural challenges and practical diffi-
culties in collecting amounts owed to them. These difficulties have been
magnified as an increasing number of clients have chosen to avoid the
time delays and costs associated with probate administration.1 The law
has become even more complex as wealthy clients have actively planned
to avoid creditor claims by using asset-protection techniques. This Article
explores the impact of these evolving planning techniques on the collec-
tion of claims by decedent's creditors as against nonprobate transfers.
The increased use of nonprobate transfers exacerbates the difficulties
faced by decedent's creditors. Dissatisfaction with the cost and time
involved in probate administration leads many estate planning clients to
use alternative forms of transferring property at death, commonly referred
to as "nonprobate transfers" or "testamentary substitutes."2 Probate
procedures generally do not apply to nonprobate transfers. As a result,
one set of laws, often referred to as probate procedures, control those
assets passing pursuant to decedent's will, or if decedent does not have a
will, pursuant to intestacy. Different laws govern nonprobate assets
passing pursuant to beneficiary designation on assets such as life
insurance, trusts, bank accounts, brokerage accounts, and retirement
plans, and those assets passing pursuant to joint tenancy designations
with right of survivorship. While the developing law with regard to
nonprobate transfers has successfully minimized the cost and time
involved in passing property at death, it has been slow to address
comprehensively the payment of decedent's creditors. In fact, instead of
addressing creditor needs, the developing law has moved in the opposite
I "Probate" technically refers to the determination by the court that a document is in
fact a decedent's will. Estate planners often use the term to refer to the entire process of
estate administration, including the marshaling of assets, the payment of creditors, and the
distribution to beneficiaries named in decedent's will. This Article refers generally to the
process of administering assets passing pursuant to a will or intestacy statutes as "probate
administration" or "probate procedures."
2 Not all assets pass under a will. The Uniform Probate Code recognizes that contracts
or deeds may serve to pass property at death outside the terms of a will. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 6-101 (amended 1998), 8 Part II U.L.A. 173 (Supp. 2006). The Uniform Probate
Code is also available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upc/finat2005.htm. Estate
planners refer to assets that pass automatically at death pursuant to a contract or deed as
"nontestamentary" or "nonprobate" transfers. Only those assets owned by decedent at death
and not automatically passing pursuant to the terms of a deed or other contract pass under a
will.
WINTER 2007
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direction.3  Courts have recognized that "[t]he proliferation of
testamentary substitutes ... has left the law in a state of confusion over
the rights of creditors to other assets that do not pass under the will or as
part of intestate administration." 4
Fragmentation of the law applicable to transfers at death increases the
time and cost incurred by decedent's creditors. Creditors face delays
because they often must pursue probate administration, even in the ab-
sence of probate assets, prior to pursuing the nonprobate transferee
directly. In addition, the law completely protects certain types of
nonprobate transfers from pursuit by creditors. The legal rules governing
nonprobate transfers at death depend in large part on the type of
nonprobate asset and the manner in which decedent held title to the asset.
The creditor must navigate these different rules prior to collecting the
debt owed. This fragmented system stands in stark contrast to the com-
prehensive, orderly rules for resolving creditor claims historically pro-
vided by probate procedures. Avoidance of probate often leaves the
decedent's creditors in an untenable position.
This Article focuses solely on creditor claims arising prior to death
that remain unpaid as of death.5 Part II highlights through examples the
difficulties the fragmented system causes for creditors. Part III examines
key probate procedures governing creditor claims, and Part IV contrasts
those procedures with the procedures for collecting creditor claims from
nonprobate assets. Part IV also explores the ability of creditors to reach
specific types of nonprobate assets. With this background, Part V then
3 An entire body of literature has developed regarding asset protection planning. See
Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGs L.J.
287 (2002); Henry J. Lischer Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to
Liability, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 (2000); John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule
Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the Delaware Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts,
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423 (1998). Asset protection planning relies principally on the use of
trusts and other nonprobate transfers. Some states have enacted statutes allowing for asset
protection trusts in which a trustor can transfer assets in trust, grant the trustee discretion
to make payments to trustor, and provide for protection of trust assets from creditors. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572 (2006).
4 In re Gallet, 765 N.Y.S.2d 157, 160 (Sur. Ct. 2003).
5 All references to "claims" in this Article refer to claims arising prior to decedent's
death. Different procedures may apply to claims arising at or after a decedent's death.
Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a) with § 3-803(c) (amended 1997), 8 Part II
U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006) (giving one year for presenting claims arising before death of
decedent but only four months for presenting claims arising at or after decedent's death).
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suggests legislative reforms that would better balance both the interests of
beneficiaries and the interests of a decedent's creditors.
The legislative reforms proposed in this Article urge unification of
the creditor claims procedure for all probate and nonprobate transfers to
the extent feasible, thereby avoiding the cascading effect of currently
enacted legislative solutions. The provision of one forum, in which all
assets are equally subject to the claims of creditors, furthers the policy of
efficient passage of property at death and encourages fair treatment of all
creditors and beneficiaries. The legislative reforms strive to accommo-
date those clients who wish to avoid the cost and time involved in probate
administration, and at the same time provide a minimally intrusive, but
comprehensive, system for resolving creditor claims. The proposed
legislative reforms achieve these goals by triggering a unified claims
procedure only when beneficiaries of probate and nonprobate assets are
unwilling to apportion and pay known creditor claims.
II. THE PLIGHT OF CREDITORS IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM
A. Examples of Procedural Hurdles
Creditors face a number of difficulties when attempting to collect
against probate and nonprobate assets. States often require the creditor to
pursue probate assets before pursuing nonprobate transferees. Some
states protect certain types of assets over other assets. These requirements
translate into unnecessary time delays and increased costs to the creditor.
The following examples specifically demonstrate these difficulties.
Example 1: Prior to her death, decedent had made charges on her
credit card up to her credit limit. At her death, decedent owned a
bank account with only a minimal balance naming her sister as pay-
on-death beneficiary and a modest brokerage account naming her
sister as transfer-on-death beneficiary. The beneficiary designations
automatically passed the value of the accounts at decedent's death to
her sister. Because the sister received the account balances
immediately on decedent's death, the sister did not open a probate.
Each time a creditor letter requesting payment was received,
decedent's sister replied by sending a death certificate and a letter
indicating no probate had been opened and no personal representative
had been appointed.6 After responding to each creditor once, the
6 State law likely protected the creditors of the decedent by subjecting both the bank
WINTER 2007
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sister made no further reply to follow-up letters sent to the decedent's
address (which was the same address as the sister's) and returned the
letters to sender. Eventually the creditors ceased collection efforts,
and the sister retained the balances received as named beneficiary.' It
can be assumed that the creditor rejected further collection efforts
because the costs of finding decedent's assets could prove to be
greater than the amount of debt owed any single creditor. Thus, the
creditors of decedent remained unpaid, and decedent's sister retained
the amounts in the two accounts even though creditors were legally
entitled to the value of those accounts.
Example 2: Decedent died in California having placed a substantial
portion of his assets in a revocable trust. The assets subject to probate
procedures were insufficient to pay all creditor claims. The creditor
claim at issue involved a dispute over a buy-sell agreement. Pursuant
to California law, the creditor filed a claim in probate and pursued
protracted litigation, eventually proving the claim. Prior to a
judgment being issued in the litigation, the trustee of the revocable
trust distributed the trust assets to the beneficiaries named in the
trust. The creditor then sued to surcharge the trustee and hold the
trustee personally liable for making distribution of trust assets while
the probate claim was still being litigated. The California court ruled
that the trustee owed a duty only to beneficiaries of the trust, and
because the trustee made the distributions prior to the creditor
obtaining its judgment, the trustee did not breach any duty owed and
could not be surcharged. The creditor was then left to pursue the
distributees of the revocable trust.8 This example demonstrates the
and the brokerage account to the claims of decedent's creditors. The sister should have
used the money received to pay the creditor claims once the creditor followed the
appro7priate procedure to collect on the claim.
These are essentially the facts as related to the author in a 2003 conversation with
decedent's sister long after decedent's death. Had the sister received legal advice at the
time of decedent's death, it is hoped that she would have responded differently to the
creditors. It was clear in the conversation with the sister, however, that she wanted to keep
the money she received on the death of her sister to the extent that she could.
8 See Dobler v. Arluk Med. Ctr. Indus. Group (Dobler 1), 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478 (Ct.
App. 2001); Arluk Med. Ctr. Indus. Group v. Dobler (Dobler I), 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194 (Ct.
App. 2004); see also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 19400, 19401 (West 2006) (providing
California rules regarding transferee liability). For a complete discussion of these two
cases and an analysis of their effect on creditors, see John Hartog & Bart Schenone, Alice
in Tulsa-land: The Dobler Effect of Creditors of Revocable Trusts, 10 CAL. TR. & EST. Q.
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increased costs and time facing the creditor when attempting to
collect against nonprobate transfers.
Example 3: An unsecured creditor of decedent followed its normal
collection procedures against debtor. The creditor, owner of a small
business, was unaware that debtor had died. The personal representa-
tive of decedent's estate chose not to initiate a probate proceeding
until one year after decedent's death. The applicable state statute of
limitations for pursuing a creditor claim was one year. By the time
the creditor discovered the death of decedent and a probate was
opened, all creditor claims as against both probate and nonprobate
assets effectively had been barred by the statute of limitations. The
creditor believed the personal representative waited to initiate pro-
bate proceedings for the specific purpose of letting the statute of
limitations run.9 This example highlights the need for diligence on
the part of a decedent's creditors.
Example 4: As part of a structured settlement involving her mother's
prior death, decedent was the beneficiary of an annuity owned by
Hartford Insurance Company. The annuity specified that on her
death, the amounts owed to decedent would pass to her heirs. Dece-
dent died owing substantial sums to creditors. The creditors
attempted to collect their claims against the proceeds of the annuity
policy. A New York court held that by law the proceeds of the annu-
ity could not be made subject to creditor claims.' 0 This is an example
of certain statutory protections that preclude creditors from asserting
claims against specific types of nonprobate transfers.
These examples aptly point out cost and time hurdles facing a decedent's
creditors when pursuing claims against probate and nonprobate assets.
4 (2004).
9 This example derives from a 2002 conversation with a creditor discussing legal
options available to pursue its creditor claim. The comment to Uniform Probate Code
section 3-803 discusses the choice of a one-year statute of limitations similar to the one
applicable to the creditor in the example and states in part: "Successors who are willing to
delay receipt and enjoyment of inheritances may consider waiting out the non-claim
period running from death simply to avoid any public record of an administration that
might alert known and unknown creditors to pursue their claims." UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 2006). The successors in this
example chose to avail themselves of this choice.
0 See In re Estate of Clotworthy, 742 N.Y.S.2d 168 (App. Div. 2002).
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It is important, however, to place these examples in perspective and
to recognize that not all creditors face these hurdles. Probate lawyers find
that many beneficiaries choose to pay decedent's creditors."1 They do this
for a number of reasons, including the need to obtain further credit, the
feeling of moral obligation, and the maintenance of their reputation in
the community. Creditors generally find this to be true as well.' 2 The
problem arises when beneficiaries use the law to make it difficult for
creditors to collect the debt owed to them. The law, as it develops with
regard to nonprobate transfers, ideally should provide the same cost and
time efficiencies to creditors as it has done for beneficiaries. To the
extent that the law subjects assets to debts of a decedent, procedural rules
should support the creditor's right to be paid. Adoption of procedural
rules that fairly balance the interests of creditors and beneficiaries will
lead to greater cost and time efficiencies for both parties and will mini-
mize the burden on judicial resources by decreasing the need to involve
courts in the resolution of a prolonged series of judicial proceedings.
B. Policy Implications of Procedural Hurdles
These four examples highlight the tension between the two
overriding policies that guide development of procedures related to
passing a decedent's property at death. Those two policies are (1) to
facilitate the passage of a decedent's property to beneficiaries in the most
time and cost efficient manner, 13 and (2) to promote economic efficiency
I Very seldom has the author had a client actively resist payment of creditor claims
when assets could have been made available from nonprobate assets to pay claims. The
comments to the Uniform Probate Code reflect this experience: "[T]he vast majority of
[estates] are routinely applied to quick payment of the decedents' bills and distributed
without any creditor controversy." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8
Part II U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 2006). The author's recent conversations with other attorneys and
with creditors, however, indicate this general willingness to pay may not be as pervasive
now as in the past.
12 See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1121 (1984). In his article, Langbein states: "In the
vast majority of cases, survivors pay off decedents' debts voluntarily and rapidly." Id.
Langbein bases his conclusion on discussions with the credit officers at a number of major
department stores.
13 See 1 JAMES HENDERSON, BANCROFT'S PROBATE PRACTICE § 14, at 35 (Bancroft-
Whitney Co., 2d ed. 1950) (1923) (citing Dennis v. Bint, 54 P. 378 (Cal. 1898) and
Hilliard v. McCrory, 134 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1943)); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-
1015 (2005) (providing that a personal representative who has not distributed estate
within two years must appear before court and show cause for continued administration);
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by encouraging debtors to pay their debts.14 Similar policies should
underlie development of the law regarding nonprobate transfers.
Arguably, the minimization of any specific procedural rights allowing
decedent's creditors to pursue nonprobate transferees on the same basis
as probate transferees decreases both the time and costs incurred by
nonprobate transferees, and for that reason is preferred by beneficiaries.
At the same time, the minimization of those rights often increases the
time and costs incurred by decedent's creditors holding valid claims. The
lack of clear procedural safeguards for creditors also encourages
beneficiaries and fiduciaries to take steps to avoid payment of creditor
claims even though assets received by them are legally subject to such
claims. As a result, this lack of safeguards undercuts the policy goal of
encouraging debtors to pay debts. Balancing these policies suggests the
need for procedural safeguards sufficient to allow timely payment of
claims by fiduciaries, and by probate and nonprobate transferees, without
unnecessarily increasing time and costs of administration.
Good policy dictates that, to the extent the law makes an asset avail-
able for payment of a creditor's claims, the law also should provide clear
and simple procedures for collecting claims as against that asset. The
current lack of clear and simple procedures, as demonstrated by the
examples, increases the cost and time of debt collection to both creditors
and beneficiaries and runs counter to the longstanding policies underlying
legal rules for transferring property on a decedent's death. The examples
demonstrate the need for specific legislative changes.
As indicated in the first example, to the extent an asset is subject to
creditor claims, creditor claim procedures should provide a timely and
efficient method for discovering the location and ownership of assets
subject to claims. In that example the surviving sister refused to provide
information regarding assets. Specifically, creditors need to be able to
discover the whereabouts and ownership of available assets in a cost
efficient manner. Procedural rules should not allow beneficiaries to hide
assets that the law otherwise makes available for payment of the claims
of decedent's creditors. The policy favoring payment of creditor claims,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 12200 (West 2006) (noting that a personal representative must
petition for final distribution of estate or report status of estate administration not later
than one year from appointment if no federal estate tax return is due, and eighteen months
if one is due).
14 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979);
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).
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however, must be balanced with the need of beneficiaries to maintain
privacy as to assets received and owned. In order to balance these com-
peting interests, any legislative reform should provide information re-
garding available assets only to creditors with valid claims against a
decedent's assets.
The second example demonstrates the need to unify probate and
nonprobate procedures for the collection of claims by a decedent's credi-
tors. In that example, the creditor has to bring more than one action to
collect on its claim. Any legislative proposal should require that all
creditor claims be decided in one forum and, in addition, should add
provisions to adjudicate the rights of all concerned-creditors, pro-
bate beneficiaries, and nonprobate beneficiaries-at one time. Unifi-
cation of procedures so that all interested parties may be joined in one
proceeding promotes the policy of efficiently using judicial resources.
Any legislative change of this nature, however, should consider the
interests of nonprobate beneficiaries. Persons choose to pass property by
nonprobate transfers to avoid the time and costs of probate administra-
tion. Nonprobate assets pass immediately to named beneficiaries on the
death of the decedent. Thus, any legislative reform should require a
hearing that joins nonprobate transferees only when those transferees,
who receive assets otherwise subject to the claims of decedent's credi-
tors, decline to pay creditor claims voluntarily.
The one-year statute of limitations for the collection of creditor
claims, as imposed by state law in the third example, requires creditors to
pursue collection of claims in a diligent and time efficient manner. While
any statute of limitations should allow creditors ample opportunity to file
claims, it should not unreasonably prolong the passage of clear title
following decedent's death. Any legislative change should consider both
current business practices for the collection of claims and the need for
timely resolution of all claims so that beneficiaries hold clear title.
Finally, the fourth example highlights the fact that the law exempts
certain assets such as certain annuities from the claims of a decedent's
creditors. As evidenced by the need for litigation in the example, it is not
always clear whether an asset is subject to payment of creditor claims.
Any legislative change should clarify which assets are available and those
assets which are not available for payment of a decedent's creditors.
Increased clarity as to whether an asset may be used to satisfy the claims
of decedent's creditors would lead to more efficient use of judicial
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resources and more efficient administration of the passage of decedent's
probate and nonprobate assets.
Although to date legislative reforms tend to favor beneficiaries,
creditors likely will take a more active role in changing the law to favor
creditor interests should the balance shift too far in the direction of
favoring beneficiaries. For example, as states have begun to adopt laws
protecting certain self-settled trusts from creditors of the settlor, steps
were taken as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005"5 to minimize the ability to use self-settled trusts
to avoid payment of claims in bankruptcy. The Act allows the bankruptcy
trustee to avoid transfers to certain self-settled trusts made on or within
ten years of filing the bankruptcy petition. 6 As was done with the bank-
ruptcy rules, creditors likely will begin to present state law legislation
that favors their interests. 17 It is important that any future legislative
reforms balance the interests of all parties--creditors and beneficiaries
alike.
III. PROBATE PROCEDURES FOR RESOLUTION OF CREDITOR
CLAIMS
Historically, probate procedures have governed the ability of a dece-
dent's creditors to collect claims. Not surprisingly, legislative changes to
accommodate the payment of claims from nonprobate transferees have
built on these historic probate procedures. Probate procedures are state
specific. The law of each state varies as to treatment of claims by dece-
dent's creditors. Generally, state law sets forth rules for notification and
presentment of a claim within a specific time period and delineates the
order for payment of claims in the event of an insolvent estate.
A. The Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Probate
Code to serve as a model for the administration and passage of a
15 Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1402, 119 Stat. 23, 214-15 (2005).
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e) (Supp. 2006).
17 During the last two years, the author has had occasion to comment on and review
legislation proposed by creditors to allow more time to collect claims against nonprobate
transfers. The proposed legislation reviewed was extreme in its protection of creditors, and
the creditors were unable to find a legislator to sponsor the bill. The tenor of the proposed
legislation, however, indicates that creditors likely will become more active as claims go
unpaid because of the use of nonprobate transfers.
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decedent's assets. It is the only comprehensive model act to specify
procedures for the administration of both probate and nonprobate assets.
Its adoption by the legislatures of seventeen states is evidence of the
widespread approval of its procedures. 8 Because the Uniform Probate
Code serves as the primary model for legislative change, this Article
principally focuses on the provisions of that code. Although considerable
variation exists among the several states concerning the details of the
procedures for filing claims by decedent's creditors, basic creditor
procedures of most states resemble, at least in part, the procedures set
forth in the Uniform Probate Code.
Recent amendments to the Uniform Probate Code, adopted in 1997
and 1998, address some of the issues faced by creditors with regard to
nonprobate property.1 9 However, not all states that have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code have adopted these recent amendments, and
creditors in those states remain subject to probate procedures that fail to
address directly the changing landscape between probate and nonprobate
transfers of assets at death.2"
18 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 Part II U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2006).
19 The Uniform Probate Code includes the provisions of a separate free-standing act
entitled the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 58
(2001), which contains a specific section added in 1998, section 102, addressing the rights
of creditors as against nonprobate transferees. The Uniform Probate Code codifies section
102 as section 6-102. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102 (amended 1998), 8 Part II U.L.A.
174 (Supp. 2006). It also clarifies that the limitations on creditor claims apply with equal
force to nonprobate transfers. See id. § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39 (Supp.
For examples of states that have adopted section 6-102 of the Uniform Probate
Code (also codified as section 102 of the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act)
and incorporated its provisions as part of their respective probate codes, see, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-6102 (West 2005), IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-6-107 (2005), IND.
CODE 32-17-13-3 (West 2005), N.M. STAT. § 45-6-102 (LexisNexis 2005), OKLA. STAT.
tit. 71, § 910 (West 2005), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4359 (2005). For examples of states
that have adopted the amendments to Uniform Probate Code section 3-803, see, e.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:3-803 (LexisNexis 2005) (adopting a reference to "decedent's
trustee" instead of"nonprobate transferees"), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3803 (West
2005), N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-19-03 (2005). For examples of states that have not
adopted the amendments to Uniform Probate Code section 3-803, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.16.450 (LexisNexis 2005), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3803 (West 2005), COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-12-803 (2005), IDAHO CODE ANN. § 75-3-803 (2005), ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-803 (2005), MINN. STAT. § 524.3-803 (West 2005), MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-3-803 (2005), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2485 (LexisNexis 2005), S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-3-803 (2005), UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-803 (West 2005).
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The recent amendments to the Uniform Probate Code addressing the
impact of nonprobate transfers on creditor claims essentially were two-
pronged. First, in 1997, the nonclaim statute that works to bar collection
of creditor claims not presented within one year from the date of dece-
dent's death was made specifically applicable to nonprobate transfers.21
This amendment followed the 1989 Uniform Probate Code amendments
reducing the ultimate time bar of the nonclaim statute from three years to
one year22 and allowing optional (as opposed to mandatory) publication
of notice and actual notice to creditors.23 Second, the 1998 Uniform
Probate Code amendments set forth new rules regarding the liability of
nonprobate transferees for claims of decedent's creditors.24 While the
1998 amendments provide welcome procedures for collection of claims
against nonprobate transferees, the amendments, taken as a whole, have
forced creditors to be more diligent. Creditors rarely receive any public or
actual notice of death and must make their own inquiry. Creditors also
must act more quickly to preserve their right to collect and must act, if at
all, within one year of death. The practical impact of these amendments
to the Uniform Probate Code is to place a greater burden on creditors.
B. General Procedure for Filing and Paying Creditor Claims.
Probate procedures often affect whether a decedent's creditor may
pursue its claim as against both probate and nonprobate assets. The
Uniform Probate Code forces creditors initially to pursue claims through
the probate process.2 Prior to the 1989 amendments, the personal
21 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp.
200,h See id. The statute prior to its amendment barred creditor claims arising prior to
death as against a decedent's estate "unless presented as follows: (1) within 4 months after
the date of the first publication of notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with
Section 3-801 .... (2) within [3] years after the decedent's death, if notice to creditors has
not been published." Id. § 3-803 (prior to 1989 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 218 (1998).
23 See id. § 3-801 (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208 (1998). The statute now
provides that before adopting Uniform Probate Code section 3-801, the state must choose
between mandatory and optional publication notice to creditors.24 See id. § 6-102 (adopted 1998), 8 Part II U.L.A. 174 (Supp. 2006), also codified as
UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102, 8B U.L.A. 62-63 (2001). See
discussion infra Part III.
25 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39 (Supp.
2006); see also id § 3-104, 8 Part II U.L.A. 36 (1998) ("No proceeding to enforce a claim
against the estate of a decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced before the
appointment of a personal representative .... [AIlI proceedings and actions to enforce a
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representative was required to publish notice to creditors, and publication
of notice began the creditor claim process.26 The amendments now
provide for the optional giving of notice to creditors. Thus, the creditor
claims procedures might begin with publication of notice to creditors
announcing that claims must be filed with the personal representative
within four months of the date of publication, but such notice is not
claim against the estate are governed by the procedure prescribed ....")
Note, however, that some states like New York, a non-Uniform Probate Code state,
do not require the creditor to file its claim with the personal representative. See In re
Goldberg, 220 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 1960). For an explanation of New York law
and the Surrogate Court Procedure Act, see 4 WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATE'S
COURT PRACTICE § 71.02[2][a] (Lexis 2005) (citing King v. Nicholson, 554 N.Y.S.2d 760
(App. Term 1990):
Pursuant to SCPA 1803(3) a claimant may not enforce payment of a
claim in the Surrogate's Court unless the claim is presented to the
fiduciary in accordance with the provisions of SCPA 1803 or unless it
is based upon a decree or order of the court or a valid judgment. As
this section implies, and as SCPA 1810 makes clear, a creditor of an
estate may pursue an action on his claim in another court without ever
presenting his claim to the fiduciary or taking any action in the
Surrogate's Court. However, if a claimant wishes to proceed in the
Surrogate's Court pursuant to SCPA Article 18, he is required to
follow the dictates of SCPA 1803.
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
California requires that claims be presented within the one-year statute of limitations.
See Levine v. Levine, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 261-62 (Ct. App. 2002). Claims may be
presented as part of probate proceedings or pursuant to alternative creditor claim
procedures to be initiated at the option of the trustee of decedent's revocable trust. See
CAL. PROB. CODE § 19003 (West 2006).26 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 (prior to 1989 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 209
(1998); see also. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-801 (2005). Some states that have not adopted
the Uniform Probate Code instead require the personal representative to give notice of
estate administration to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. See, e.g., CAL. PROB.
CODE § 9050 (West 2006). The requirement, however, may be circumvented by avoiding
initiation of any probate and waiting for the statute of limitations to run, which is
generally one year. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 366.2 (West 2006) (imposing one-year
statute of limitations).
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required.27 Creditors, thus, may never receive notice that claims must be
filed.
Regardless of whether notice is provided, creditors must present their
claims within the time allowed or be barred from thereafter collecting on
the claim.28 Generally, claims may be presented to the personal represen-
tative or filed with the probate court. 29 The personal representative then
will disallow or allow a claim.3" If the claim is disallowed, the creditor
27 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208 (1998)
(allowing states the option of making publication notice optional and providing for
permissive actual notice). Some states, like New York, have repealed any requirement for
publication of notice on the basis that the shorter time limitation triggered by notice
publication was not widely used. 4 HEATON, supra note 25, § 71.02 (noting the 1993
Legislature repealed former New York Surrogate's Court Procedure Act section 1801).
28 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp.
2006). Upon publication notice, if given, creditors must file any claims "within four
months after the date of the first publication of notice or be forever barred." Id. § 3-801
(amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208 (1998). The personal representative also may
provide actual notice to a creditor and require claims be filed "within four months after the
published notice, if given . . . , or within 60 days after the mailing or other delivery of the
notice, whichever is later." Id. § 3-801(b). If no notice is given, then claims must be
presented within one year from the date of decedent's death. See id. § 3-803(a)(1)
(amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006).
California requires publication of notice of commencement of probate proceedings,
but does not have a specific requirement for publication notice to creditors. See CAL.
PROB. CODE § 8125 (West 2006). California also requires the personal representative to
notify known and reasonably ascertainable creditors as to estate administration. See id. §
9050. In the event of such notice, the creditor must present the claim within sixty days of
delivery of the notice. See id. § 9052. California law provides the personal representative
some immunity for failure to give notice under certain circumstances in which the
personal representative does not act in bad faith. See id. § 9053.
New York requires claims be presented within seven months from the date letters are
issued to the fiduciary. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1802 (McKinney 2006).
The seven-month limitation serves to protect the fiduciary. Upon passage of the seven-
month time period, a creditor may not charge the fiduciary for assets distributed to
beneficiaries in good faith. See id The "good faith" requirement means that to the extent a
fiduciary has knowledge, actual or constructive, of a claim not formally presented, the
fiduciary cannot avoid liability if the fiduciary distributes assets before satisfying the
claim. See id; see also In re Lukin's Estate, 207 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
29 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-804 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 47 (Supp.
2006). A creditor also may commence a proceeding against the personal representative
within the time limit for presenting claims. See id.
30 See id. § 3-806 (amended 1987), 8 Part 1I U.L.A. 242-43 (1998). This section
requires the personal representative to disallow a claim within sixty days after the time for
presentation of the claim has expired. Absent a disallowance, the claim is deemed allowed.
The section also provides some ability for the personal representative to change an
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must commence a proceeding contesting the disallowance to preserve its
claim.3
The personal representative pays the claims in a certain order of
priority depending on the class of claim.32 Generally, administration
expenses, funeral expenses, debts owed to the federal and state govern-
ments, and expenses of the last illness take priority over other claims. The
personal representative may pay these claims from estate assets.33 The
order of payment becomes important when an estate is insolvent. Prior to
the 1998 amendments, the Uniform Probate Code did not specifically
address procedures for collection of claims as against nonprobate trans-
ferees in the event estate assets are insufficient to pay all claims.
When a decedent's probate estate has sufficient assets to pay credi-
tors, probate procedures adequately protect creditors' interests. Creditors
generally can determine where to file the claim by reviewing court re-
cords in the place of decedent's last domicile. Once the creditor timely
presents a claim, the personal representative must use probate assets to
pay the claim. Probate procedures give priority to payment of creditor
claims and only allow distribution to beneficiaries of those assets remain-
ing after full payment of creditor claims.
The difficulty arises for creditors when a decedent leaves an insol-
vent estate. Insolvency occurs when insufficient probate assets exist to
allowance or disallowance. The personal representative only may change a disallowance to
an allowance if she does so prior to the date that is "60 days after the mailing of the notice
of disallowance," assuming the notice warns the creditor of the time bar. Id. (noting that if
the estate is insolvent and all "successors" who would be affected by the change consent,
the personal representative could still pay the claim following the sixty-day time period).
The personal representative only may change an allowance to a disallowance before
payment of the claim or before a court order or judgment indicates allowance or payment.
See id.
31 See id. (allowing the creditor sixty days after disallowance to commence an action
on its claim).
32 See id. § 3-805, 8 Part II U.L.A. 240-41 (1998). State law varies as to the order of
payment of claims. Compare id. with N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1811 (McKinney
2005), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-807 (2005). The federal super priority statute also
comes into play and requires payment of claims to the federal government to be made
before payment of claims other than administration and funeral expenses. See 31 U.S.C. §
3713 (2006) ("A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when ... the
estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administrator, is not enough
to pay all debts of the debtor."); see In re Estate of Funk, 849 N.E.2d 366, 373 (I11. 2006).
See UNWF. PROBATE CODE § 3-805, 8 Part II U.L.A. 240-41 (1998) (referencing
estates).
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pay fully all creditor claims. If an individual chooses to pass all assets by
means of nonprobate transfer, then upon death, the individual will leave
an insolvent estate. In that event, the decedent's beneficiaries often
decline to intitiate probate proceedings. Consequently, to present its
claims in a timely manner, the creditor must incur the cost of initiating
probate proceedings. A creditor may do so under the Uniform Probate
Code because a creditor falls within the definition of an "interested per-
son." 34 The creditor bears the costs and burdens of appointment with the
knowledge that insufficient estate assets exist to pay the creditor's claim.
For the creditor, this is a costly but necessary first step in the collection
process as against nonprobate transferees.
C. Purpose of the Creditor Claims Procedures
Historically, probate procedures have provided for, as one of their
purposes, a single forum within which to resolve all claims against a
decedent's estate prior to its distribution to beneficiaries.35 Providing a
single forum promotes the policy of minimizing costs and time involved
in transferring property at death. Courts recognize that the creditor claim
procedures have the primary goal of "expeditious and orderly processing"
34 See id § 1-201(24) (amended 1990), 8 Part I U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2006) (defining
"interested person" to include "creditors... and any others having a property right in or
claim against ... the estate of a decedent"); id. § 3-203(a)(6), 8 Part II U.L.A. 49 (1998)
(indicating a creditor may be appointed "45 days after the death of the decedent" if no one
else willing to serve has a prior right to appointment); see also CAL. PROB. CODE §
8461(q) (West 2006) (allowing appointment of creditor absent willingness of any other
person with higher priority to serve as administrator); id. § 9150 (allowing creditors to
bring direct petition to recover assets).
3 Commentators have long recognized the payment of decedent's creditors as being
a primary purpose served by the probate process.
[Probate] administration is designed to secure payment of debts, and
thereafter to distribute any residue to the persons entitled thereto; to
gather and to preserve the property, to pay debts, and to distribute the
balance to the persons entitled. It has been said, in fact, that there is
no other method whereby the existence of creditors or heirs of a
decedent can be conclusively established. Where one dies insolvent,
his estate is essentially a trust fund for the benefit of creditors. The
entire procedure, in effect, is essentially a winding up or dissolution,
and one of the most important elements is the marshaling of assets so
that debts may promptly be paid and the remaining assets just as
promptly distributed to those entitled to them.
1 HENDERSON, supra note 13, § 14, at 34 (footnotes omitted).
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of estate administration.36 The Uniform Probate Code bolsters the policy
of minimizing costs and time involved in transferring property at death in
three ways. First, it requires that claimants present their claims either to
the probate court or to the personal representative of decedent's estate.
Second, it broadly defines the term "claim." Finally, it subjects all claims
to similar time periods for presentment, regardless of whether the claim is
to be collected from probate or nonprobate assets. The relatively short
time frame for presenting claims leads to settlement of a decedent's estate
in an expeditious manner.
D. Property to Which Probate Procedures Apply
Although creditors must preserve claims through probate
administration, the fact that the probate court generally has jurisdiction
only over probate assets causes difficulties when those assets are
insufficient to pay all outstanding claims. Following the 1997 Uniform
Probate Code amendments, claims as against both probate and
nonprobate transferees are barred within one year from death, but the
amendments do not extend the jurisdiction of the probate courts to allow
collection of claims from nonprobate assets without institution of a
separate proceeding as against the nonprobate transferee.3 7 Jurisdiction
of the probate court extends only to a decedent's estate.38 Except for the
specific reference in the nonclaim statute to nonprobate property, other
references in the Uniform Probate Code indicate that creditor claim
procedures apply to property subject to probate proceedings. The
Uniform Probate Code refers to the term "estate" in relation to "the
property of the decedent.., as originally constituted and as it exists from
time to time during administration."39 The Code also implies that probate
procedures regarding rights of creditors apply only to property passing
pursuant to decedent's will, or in the absence of the will, to decedent's
36 Murphy v. Murphy, 1999 ND 118 24, 595 N.W.2d 571,578.
37 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 40 (Supp.
2006t8 See id. § 3-803(a) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006); see, e.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-19-03 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3803 (West
2005). For non-Uniform Probate Code states, see N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1814
(McKinney 2006); In re Estate of Davis, 217 Cal. Rptr. 734, 736 (Ct. App. 1985) (opinion
later depublished).
39 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(14) (amended 1990), 8 Part I U.L.A. 11 (Supp.
2006).
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intestate heirs.4" If the personal representative distributes property of the
estate prior to payment of creditors, the creditors, whose claims are not
barred, may pursue their claims against the distributees of the estate.4'
Distributees of the estate do not include nonprobate transferees.
Procedures for asserting claims against nonprobate transferees were
added to the Uniform Probate Code in 1998.42 The drafters did not codify
these procedures as part of the probate administration procedures. Rather,
the procedures are included under the separate Uniform Probate Code
provisions addressing "Nonprobate Transfers on Death," and as part of
the separate free-standing Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act.43
These nonprobate procedures for payment of creditor claims adhere to the
goal of providing a single forum for resolving claims against the estate.
Pursuant to these procedures, the forum for deciding creditor claims
remains the probate estate. Nonprobate transferees bear liability for
claims only to the extent the probate estate is insufficient. The liability of
the nonprobate transferee is to the probate estate, as opposed to the
claimant.44 These provisions direct that claims first be resolved as part of
the probate administration and, to the extent the probate estate is
insufficient, require institution of a separate proceeding as against the
nonprobate transferee. The separate proceeding adds cost and time to the
ultimate resolution and payment of creditor claims, and allows
beneficiaries to take steps to make it more difficult for creditors to
proceed. This result undermines both policies important to development
of the law regarding the collection of claims by decedent's creditors.
E. Claims Subject to Presentment
The Uniform Probate Code also promotes the goal of having a single
forum to decide creditor claims by using an expansive definition of the
40 See id § 3-101, 8 Part II U.L.A. 29 (1998); see also Gartley v. Gartley, 622 So. 2d
77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a claim against life insurance policy was not
subject to probate procedures regarding creditor claims because life insurance is
nonprobate asset).
41 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-104, 8 Part 1I U.L.A. 36 (1998) (referencing
Uniform Probate Code sections 3-1004 and 3-1005).
42 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102 (amended 1998), 8 Part 11 U.L.A. 174-75
(Supp. 2006).
4i See UNI. PROBATE CODE Art. VI, 8 Part II U.L.A. 173 (Supp. 2006); UNIF.
NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT (amended 2006), 8B U.L.A. 57 (2001).
44 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102(b) (amended 1998), 8 Part II U.L.A. 174 (Supp.
2006).
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term "claim." It broadly refers to "claims against a decedent's estate" as
including all claims "whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other
legal basis., 45 Even unmatured claims and disputed claims fall within the
definition of claims subject to procedures. This expansive definition
ensures that all those who might have a claim of any kind may pursue the
claim and be eligible for payment, in conjunction with and subject to
priority of all other claims.
The Uniform Probate Code requires unsecured claimants to present
their claims to the personal representative appointed to administer the
estate so that all claims can be resolved in one forum. 46 Secured
45 Id. § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006). See also id. § I-
201 (amended 1990), 8 Part I U.L.A. 10 (1998) (defining "claim" to include "liabilities of
the decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and
liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent ... including
funeral expenses and expenses of administration"). The definition specifically excludes
"estate or inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent ... to
specific assets alleged to be included in the estate." Id. California defines "claim" similarly
but specifically includes claims for taxes other than property taxes and assessments
secured by liens on real property and funeral expenses of decedent. See CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 9000 (West 2006). New York does not specifically define "debt," but provides a
procedure for contingent and unliquidated debts. See 2-28 N.Y. PRACTICE GUIDE: PROB.
AND EST. ADMIN. § 28.01[2] (Matthew Bender & Co. 2004); N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC. ACT
LAW 1804 (McKinney 2005).
See UNtE. PROBATE CODE § 3-104, 8 Part II U.L.A. 36 (1998) ("No proceeding to
enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors may be revived or
commenced before the appointment of a personal representative. After the appointment
and until distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are
governed by the procedure prescribed by this Article.") Note, however, that Uniform
Probate Code section 3-1004 recognizes: "After assets of an estate have been
distributed . . .an undischarged claim not barred may be prosecuted in a proceeding
against one or more distributees." UNtF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1004, 8 Part II U.L.A. 297
(1998). Also, if probate procedures have not been commenced, then successors of a
decedent's estate take subject to the claims of creditors pursuant to section 3-901. See id
§ 3-901, 8 Part II U.L.A. 267 (1998). Non-Uniform Probate Code states generally follow
this same approach. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 9002 (West 2006). Note, however, that
California provides an alternative procedure for presenting claims to trustee pursuant to
California Probate Code section 19003. Even those states that permissively allow creditors
to file claims as part of the probate administration induce creditors to do so by allowing
claimants who have filed their claims priority access to probate assets prior to distribution
to beneficiaries. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 12-2.1 (McKinney 2006)
("The failure of the plaintiff to present his claim to the personal representative as
prescribed by law shall not impair his right to maintain an action against distributees or
testamentary beneficiaries .... )
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creditors4 7 and those with pending claims4" do not have to comply with
this requirement. Also excepted are claims regarding title of a decedent to
an asset.49 The presentment of a claim apprises the personal
representative that an amount may be owed to the creditor. It also allows
the personal representative to prioritize and to pay out estate assets
proportionately among creditors in the event estate assets are insufficient
to pay all claims."
The presentment of all claims in one forum benefits creditors by
ensuring fair treatment of all in the event estate assets are insufficient to
pay all claims. In the absence of any nonprobate transfers, this
47 Under the Uniform Probate Code, a secured creditor generally need not present its
claim in order to enforce its security. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-104, 8 Part II U.L.A.
36 (1998), 3-803(d)(1) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006). However, if
the secured creditor wishes to preserve a right to a deficiency judgement enforceable
against the estate, the creditor generally must present its claim within the required period
of time. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-802, 8 Part II U.L.A. 261 (1998).
48 The Uniform Probate Code also allows an exception to the presentment
requirement for those claims pending at the time of death. See UNtr. PROBATE CODE § 3-
804(2), 8 Part II U.L.A. 47 (Supp. 2006) ("No presentation of claim is required in regard
to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which were pending at the time of
his death.") Some non-Uniform Probate Code states also have provided an exception for
pending claims. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 9350 (West 2006). Contra American &
Foreign Ins. Co. v. Dimson, 645 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Babbitt v.
Hronik, 623 N.W.2d 700, 704 T 7 (Neb. 2001) (failure to name personal representative as
defendant caused claim to be untimely). The exception recognizes that the personal
representative is aware of claims pending in court at a decedent's death and that
presentment of the claim would be unnecessarily repetitive. See Lovell v. One Bancorp,
755 F. Supp. 466, 468 (D. Me. 1991) (quoting In re Estate of Brown, 421 So. 2d 752, 753
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding creditor had presented the claim, but ignored the
procedure for contesting the personal representative's disallowance of the claim)); see also
Reese v. Reese, 637 P.2d 1183 (Mont. 1981).
49 Courts also have held that claims regarding title fall outside the presentment
requirement of the Uniform Probate Code because disputes regarding title address whether
an asset belongs in an estate, as opposed to whether an amount is owing. See Murphy v.
Murphy, 1999 ND 118 29, 595 N.W.2d 571, 579 (citing Estate of Powers, 552 N.W.2d
785, 787 (N.D. 1996)). For example, when a surviving joint tenant asserts a survivorship
interest and argues the asset belongs to her and not the estate, the claim of the surviving
joint tenant does not amount to a creditor claim. See id; see also UNF. PROBATE CODE §
1-201(6) (amended 1990), 8 Part I U.L.A. 10 (1998) (defining "claim" so as to exclude
"demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent ... to specific assets alleged to be
included in the estate").
50 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-805, 8 Part II U.L.A. 240-41 (1998) (listing the
order in which claims should be paid and requiring proportionate treatment of creditors in
the same class).
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requirement also aids beneficiaries by spreading the cost of claims
proportionately among beneficiaries and by allowing the passage of
remaining estate assets to beneficiaries free of all creditor claims.
Because nonprobate transferees bear liability only to the extent that the
assets subject to probate administration are insufficient, the current
system favors nonprobate transferees to the detriment of those
beneficiaries taking under the will of decedent.
F. Notification of Creditors and Time for Presentation of Claims
Given the broad application of probate procedures to claims of dece-
dent's creditors, it is paramount that creditors present claims as part of
probate administration in a timely manner. A creditor, however, may not
receive notice in time to present its claim. The recent amendments to the
creditor claims procedures of the Uniform Probate Code changed the
rules regarding publication of notice, as well as the rules regarding when
the nonclaim statute bars creditor claims. As amended, the Uniform
Probate Code no longer requires publication of notice to creditors, but
instead permissively allows a personal representative to publish notice to
creditors, to give actual written notice to known creditors, or to forgo
providing any notice to creditors.5' Also, as amended, the Uniform Pro-
bate Code specifies that regardless of whether probate procedures have
been initiated, creditors must present claims within one year of dece-
dent's death.52 These amendments, made in 1989, were enacted in reac-
tion to the Supreme Court's decision in Tulsa Professional Collection
Services v. Pope.3
The Uniform Probate Code, prior to these amendments, required
publication of notice to creditors. Upon publication of notice, creditors
were required to present all claims within four months or be forever
51 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208 (1998).
For states amending their statutes to provide for permissive notice, see IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 15-3-801 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-19-01 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-3-
801 (1997). For states not adopting the permissive notice procedures, see ALASKA STAT. §
13.16.450 (LexisNexis 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-801 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §
62-3-801 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-801 (West 1993).
52 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp.
2006). The comments to Uniform Probate Code section 3-803 explain: "The failure to
publish also means that no general non-claim period, other than the one year period
running from death, will be working for the estate." Id. cmt., at 41. See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 366.2 (West 2006) (adopting a similar one-year statute of limitations).
53 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
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barred from bringing the claim.54 In addition to this nonclaim statute, in
the event notice was not published, the Uniform Probate Code provided
for a three-year statute of limitations running from the date of decedent's
death."
The Supreme Court in Pope addressed a nonclaim statute similar to
the four-month limitation found in the Uniform Probate Code that begins
to run on publication of notice in a newspaper.56 The time bar in Pope,
however, was two months after notice by publication. The Supreme Court
held that the nonclaim statute at issue in Pope violated the due process
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found the unse-
cured claim qualified as a "species of property protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."57 The Court also found state
action sufficient to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment.58 The Court
distinguished the nonclaim statute involved in Pope from a self-executing
statute of limitations that does not rise to the level of state action.59 It
stated: "Here, in contrast, there is significant state action. The probate
court is intimately involved throughout, and without that involvement the
54 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 (prior to 1989 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208
(1998).
55 See id. § 3-803 (prior to 1989 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 218 (1998).
56 See Pope, 485 U.S. at 479. The Court noted:
Nonclaim statutes come in two basic forms. Some provide a relatively
short time period, generally two to six months, that begins to run after
the commencement of probate proceedings. Others call for a longer
period, generally one to five years, that runs from the decedent's
death. Most States include both types of nonclaim statutes in their
probate codes, typically providing that if probate proceedings are not
commenced and the shorter period therefore never is triggered, then
claims nonetheless may be barred by the longer period.
Id. at 480 (citation omitted). Oklahoma provided only for the shorter two-month time
period. See id. Oklahoma's statute contrasts with the nonclaim statute of the Uniform
Probate Code, which also provides for a longer period that runs from the decedent's death.
That time period is now one year, and before it was three years. This one-year time limit
acts as a statute of limitations because it runs regardless of any action on the part of courts
or the personal representative. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8
Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006) with UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (prior to 1989
amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 218 (1998).
57 Pope, 485 U.S. at 485 (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428 (1982)).
58 See id.
59 See id. at 487.
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time bar is never activated."6 Because the nonclaim statute can adversely
affect protected property interests, the Supreme Court found publication
notice inadequate.61 Balancing important state interests with the needs of
creditors, the Court required "actual notice to ... reasonably ascertain-
able creditors. 62
The Supreme Court holding in Pope created the need to reexamine
the nonclaim statute of the Uniform Probate Code. The question became
whether the four-month time bar running from the date of publication
served to bar any claims at all. The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code
were uncertain whether or not the holding of Pope applied to the Code's
nonclaim statute. However, they concluded in their comments: "[I]f
[Pope] applies to this code, [the four-month time bar] is useless except to
bar unknown creditors. 63 This conclusion served as the basis for the
amendments made in response to Pope, which were three-fold: (1) publi-
cation notice became permissive, as opposed to mandatory;64 (2) provi-
sions for actual notice were inserted;65 and (3) the prior three-year limita-
tion period in the absence of publication notice was reduced to a one-year
period running from the date of decedent's death.66 Unlike the nonclaim
statute addressed in Pope, the one-year statute of limitations begins to
run without any action on the part of the personal representative or pro-
bate court.67
The drafters of these amendments concluded that permissive, as
opposed to mandatory, publication furthered the efficient administration
of estates. The comments to the Uniform Probate Code acknowledge that
"[p]ublication of notice to creditors is quite expensive in some populous
areas of the country."68 In addition, the Supreme Court in Pope found
publication notice ineffective, stating:
Creditors ...are particularly unlikely to benefit from
publication notice. As a class, creditors may not be aware
of a debtor's death or of the institution of probate
60 Id.
61 See id. at 490.
" Id. at 490.
63 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 cmt. (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 209 (1998).
64 Id. § 3-801 (amended 1989), 8 Part 11 U.L.A. 209 (1998).
65 Id.
66 Id. § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp. 2006).
67 Id.
68 Id. § 3-801 cmt. (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 209 (1998).
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proceedings. Moreover, the executor or executrix will
often be, as is the case here, a party with a beneficial
interest in the estate. This could diminish an executor's
or executrix's inclination to call attention to the potential
expiration of a creditor's claim. There is thus a
substantial practical need for actual notice in this
setting."
Given the Supreme Court's assessment of the ineffectiveness of publica-
tion notice and the expense involved in providing such notice, states
should strongly consider allowing permissive publication.
Actual notice raises different issues. The Supreme Court in Pope
found that actual notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors is an effec-
tive and inexpensive means of apprising creditors of the need to present
any outstanding claims.7" It stated: "Providing actual notice to known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors . . . is not inconsistent with the goals
reflected in nonclaim states. Actual notice need not be inefficient or
burdensome. We have repeatedly recognized that mail service is an
inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice."'" The 1998 Uniform Probate Code amendments
nevertheless treat actual notice similarly to publication notice and allow
the personal representative to forgo actual notice. For the same reasons
stated by the Supreme Court (and noted in the preceding paragraph),
personal representatives, given the choice, will unlikely provide actual
notice. To do so almost ensures the filing of a claim. In contrast, the
claim might be avoided completely if actual notice is not given and the
one-year limitations period were to run without presentment of the claim.
Given that many estates, especially larger ones, remain open for more
than one year, from the point of view of estate beneficiaries, there is little
to be gained by providing actual notice and much to be lost.
The comments to the Uniform Probate Code do not directly address
the reasoning behind allowing permissive actual notice. With regard to
publication notice, however, the comments discourage states from choos-
ing mandatory publication notice by highlighting that a failure on the part
of a personal representative to publish notice would result in a breach of
duty, and consequently make the personal representative potentially liable
69 Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489 (1988).
70 See id. at 489-90.
71 Id.
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for costs of discharging the claim and enforcing contribution from benefi-
ciaries.72 One can speculate that this also may have been a determinative
factor in choosing to make actual notice permissive. In fact, the Uniform
Probate Code section providing for publication and actual notice directly
addresses this fear by absolving the personal representative of liability for
failure to publish notice.73 It would not make sense to require a personal
representative to give actual notice and in the next sentence to make the
duty meaningless by absolving her from liability.74
Although the cost of mailing actual notice might be minimal, the
practical ramifications of requiring such notice (after taking into account
the costs associated with making the determination of who is a reasonably
ascertainable creditor and the attendant costs if the wrong determination
is made) could lead one to conclude that the costs of mandatory actual
notice are inordinately high. Case law addressing such breach of duty
claims in states that have adopted mandatory actual notice proves these
costs are a valid concern.75 Other states, like New York, responded to the
concerns in Pope by no longer requiring publication notice and by elimi-
nating the possibility of shortening the time period before a fiduciary may
distribute assets to beneficiaries. New York, however, holds the fiduciary
to a "good faith" standard that precludes the fiduciary from distributing
assets to beneficiaries without first paying claims of which the fiduciary
had actual or constructive notice.76
72 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801 cmt. (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 209
(19 See id. § 3-801 (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208 (1998).
74 Note, however, that California requires actual notice and has struck a balance by
providing some liability protection for personal representatives. The California Probate
Code requires the giving of notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. See
CAL. PROB. CODE § 9050 (West 1991). It also protects the personal representative from
liability "[i]f the personal representative believes that notice to a particular creditor is or
may be required by this chapter and gives notice based on that belief" Id. § 9053. It also
protects the personal representative from failing to give notice unless it is established,
among other things, that the personal representative acted in bad faith. See id.
See, e.g., Burke v. Langdon, 190 S.W.3d 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
76 See 5 NEW YORK ESTATE ADMINISTRATION § 5.03 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005)
(citing, among other cases, In re Matter of Segall, 38 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 1941), and In re
Matter of Smith, N.Y.L.J., April 9, 1987, at 15, col. 2 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County), and
stating, "The seven-month rule protects only fiduciaries acting in good faith.... If the
fiduciary knows (or should have known) of a claim, he cannot distribute the assets without
paying the claim, even if the claimant did not present it formally.").
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The Supreme Court in Pope found that the costs of determining
"reasonably ascertainable creditors" was in fact not high.77 It noted that
"impracticable and extended searches" were not required and that all the
personal representative needed to do was use "reasonably diligent ef-
forts" to determine creditors entitled to actual notice.78 The potential
costs in relation to beneficiaries and personal representatives should be
balanced against the policy favoring payment of debts so that the econ-
omy is not required to internalize costs of nonpayment. Balancing these
interests leads to the conclusion that actual notice should be given to
reasonably ascertainable creditors.
If, upon balancing the interests of beneficiaries and creditors, a
choice instead is made to avoid the costs associated with providing actual
notice to creditors, the disadvantages to creditors of such a choice could
be lessened by providing a longer time period to file claims in the ab-
sence of notice. A longer limitations period would make it more likely
that a creditor would become aware of the death of a debtor and, once the
creditor decided to take legal action to enforce its claim, it would have
sufficient remaining time to do so. However, the drafters of the 1989
amendments, in addition to not requiring actual notice, chose not to
provide a longer limitations period. Instead, the 1989 amendments to the
Uniform Probate Code shortened the limitations period in the absence of
notice from a suggested three years to one year.79
The comments to the Uniform Probate Code acknowledge the disad-
vantages of the one-year limitations period as to creditors and respond by
explaining the policy reasons that underlie the reduction of the time
period:
The Joint Editorial Board recognized that the new bar
running one year after death may be used by some sets of
successors to avoid payment of claims against their dece-
dents of which they are aware. Successors who are will-
ing to delay receipt and enjoyment of inheritances may
consider waiting out the non-claim period running from
77 Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988).
78 Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18
70)Compare UNtF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (prior to 1989 amendment), 8 Part II
U.L.A. 218 (1998) with UNtF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A.
40 (Supp. 2006).
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death simply to avoid any public record of an administra-
tion that might alert known and unknown creditors to
pursue their claims. The scenario was deemed to be un-
likely, however, for unpaid creditors of a decedent are
interested persons who are qualified to force the opening
of an estate for purposes of presenting and enforcing
claims. Further, successors who delay opening an admin-
istration will suffer from lack of proof of title to estate
assets and attendant inability to enjoy their inheritances.
Finally, the odds that holders of important claims against
the decedent will need help in learning of the death and
proper place of administration is rather small. Any bene-
fit to such claimants of additional procedures designed to
compel administrations and to locate and warn claimants
of an impending non-claim bar, is quite likely to be
heavily outweighed by the costs such procedures would
impose on all estates, the vast majority of which are
routinely applied to quick payment of the decedents'
bills and distributed without any creditor controversy.8"
The comments assume that creditors will act quickly to enforce claims
and that beneficiaries in most cases will want to pay outstanding claims.
The comments also interpret Pope to require actual notice only with
respect to enforcement of a nonclaim statute that shortens the time limit
for bringing claims upon publication notice, as opposed to a statute of
limitations that automatically runs from the date of death.
A recent Montana case demonstrates that creditors may not take legal
action to enforce a claim as quickly as one year after death.81 In that case,
Deaconess Billings Clinic provided health care to decedent. Decedent
died on January 24, 1998. Deaconess Billings Clinic did not take steps to
have itself appointed as personal representative until March 22, 2000,
well after the one year nonclaim period had run. The district court held
the clinic's claim time barred.82 This is one of a number of cases that has
enforced the time bar of an applicable nonclaim statute.83
80 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8 part II U.L.A. 216-17
(1998) (citation omitted).
81 See In re Estate of Taylor, 2002 MT 1393, 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2366.
82 See id.
83 See, e.g., Levine v. Levine, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255 (Ct. App. 2002); Wishbone, Inc.
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G. Applicability of One-Year Limitation Period to Nonprobate Transfers
Some of the states that originally adopted the Uniform Probate Code
have not adopted the recent amendment making this one-year limitation
period applicable to both probate and nonprobate transfers.84 In these
states, the issue arises as to whether the nonclaim statute serves to bar
claims as against both probate and nonprobate transfers. The comments
classify the 1997 amendment applying the nonclaim statute to both
probate and nonprobate transfers as merely "technical."85 The comments
explain that the amendment eliminates any implication raised by a former
section of the Uniform Probate Code that creditors may reach nonprobate
transferees in payment of claims with no imposition of a time bar. 6 The
fact that the 1997 amendment was deemed to be only "technical" in
nature indicates the lack of any widespread acceptance of such an impli-
cation."
v. Eppinger, 829 P.2d 434 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) overruled by In re Estate of Hall, 948
P.2d 539 (Colo. 1997); In re Estate of Mayfield, 771 P.2d 179 (N.M. 1989); In re Estate
of Oney, 624 P.2d 1037 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
84 See discussion supra note 20; see also ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.460 (LexisNexis
2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3803 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-803
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-803 (2001 & Supp. 2006); N.M. STAT. § 45-3-803
(LexisNexis 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-803 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-803
(West 1993).
85 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 41
(Supp. 2006).
See id.:
[T]he words "and nonprobate transferees" were added to subsection
(a) to clarify that the Code's non-claim bar protects probate as well as
nonprobate successors against claims of unsatisfied creditors of the
decedent. Section 6-101(b) of the original Code, which was replaced
by Section 6-102 in 1998, implied that unsatisfied creditors of the
decedent had rights to reach nonprobate transferees in payment of
allowed claims but imposed no time bar.
Section 6- 101(a) addresses nonprobate transfers on death and states that those transfers
are nontestamentary. See id. § 6-101(a) (amended 1998), 8 Part II U.L.A. 173 (Supp.
2006). Former section 6-101(b), now deleted in its entirety, simply stated: "This section
does not limit rights of creditors under other laws of this State." Id. § 6-101 (prior to 1998
amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 430 (1998).
87 This implication was alluded to in Brown v. Delaney, 840 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005). Although the appellate court reversed and held the claims barred by the
nonclaim statute, it noted: "Prior to the enactment [of the statute specifically setting a time
limit to assert claims as against trust property], claims brought by creditors of a decedent
against the decedent's trust property were not subject to any time constraints under the
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The statutes of some states avoid any confusion regarding the issue of
whether the nonclaim statute applies to both probate and nonprobate
property by statutorily imposing a similar nonclaim time bar as against
certain nonprobate transfers.88 Other states have avoided this issue in the
same manner adopted by the 1998 amendments to the Uniform Probate
Code by specifically requiring all claims be resolved as part of the pro-
bate proceedings. 9 Some courts impliedly subject all creditor claims to
the nonclaim statute by allowing the personal representative to compel
the nonprobate transferee to contribute to the satisfaction of the estate's
claimants.9" By requiring all claims against a decedent's estate to be
subject to probate procedures and to be resolved in one forum, the over-
riding policy of efficient administration of estates is furthered.
H. Personal Representative Duties and Choices
Upon advising the personal representative of the choices regarding
the giving of notice pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code and the impact
on the limitations periods of the different choices, it is not clear whether a
personal representative, having the beneficiaries' interests in mind, would
make the choice to provide publication notice. It is also not clear whether
a personal representative, with the consent of the estate beneficiaries,
would choose to provide actual notice to those creditors with large claims
prior to the running of the one-year limitation period.
An attorney must analyze for her client the advantages and disadvan-
tages of providing notice to begin the running of an alternative limitations
period under the Uniform Probate Code. 9' The client's choices under the
Uniform Probate Code essentially are as follows:
trust code." Id.
88 See, e.g., Embree v. Embree, 22 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787-88 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.2 (West 2004) and CAL. PROB. CODE § 19400 (West 2004));
Becklund v. Fleming, 869 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing FLA. STAT. §
737.3057 (West 1994) (repealed 1995)); Hoffmann v. Estate of Hoffman, 23 S.W.3d 646,
649 (8Mo. Ct. App. 2000).See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.33.215 (LexisNexis 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §
11.18.200 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006).
90 See In re Estate of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852, 858 (N.J. Hudson County Ct.
1975); Amsouth Bank v. Galef, CV0540041975, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 325 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2006)..
91 This discussion assumes that the amendments to the Uniform Probate Code
properly interpreted the holding of the Supreme Court in Pope regarding the giving of
actual notice. See supra text accompanying notes 53-71.
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(1) Publish notice to creditors so that unknown creditors
will be barred from bringing a claim four months
from date of first publication of notice;
92
(2) Provide actual notice to creditors to bar specific
claims after the latter of (I) four months from the
date of first publication of notice, or (ii) sixty days
following actual notice; 93
(3) Provide no notice and all claims will be barred on the
earlier to occur of (I) one year after decedent's
death,94 or (ii) the running of another statute of limi-
tations applicable to the specific claim after a four-
month suspension following decedent's death.95
These choices are not mutually exclusive.
When analyzing these three options, attorneys should keep in mind
the Uniform Probate Code exceptions to the running of the one-year
limitations period. Specifically, mortgages, pledges, or other liens upon
property of the estate escape the limitations period.96 If liability insurance
protects the decedent or personal representative against a claim, the one-
year limitation does not apply to the extent of the insurance protection
provided.97 Finally, claims for personal representative, attorney, or ac-
countant fees incurred by the personal representative in administering the
92 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a)(2) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39
(Supp. 2006). Given the holding in Pope, it is unclear whether publication notice could
ever serve to bar claims within the four-month period adopted by the Uniform Probate
Code with respect to reasonably ascertainable creditors. See supra text accompanying
notes 53-71.
93 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a)(2) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39
(Supp. 2006). It could be argued that the reasoning of Pope requires actual notice to
reasonably ascertainable creditors as a matter of due process. However, that is not the
interpretation underlying the amendments to the Uniform Probate Code. The Uniform
Probate Code presupposes that a one-year limitation period that automatically runs from
decedent's death without any further action on the part of a representative of the estate
does not require the giving of any notice. Id.
94 See id. § 3-803(a)(1) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 2006).
95 See id. § 3-802(b) (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 211 (1998).
96 See id. § 3-803(d)(1) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2006).
97 See id. § 3-803(d)(2) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2006); see Wagg
v. Estate of Dunham, 42 P.3d 968 (Wash. 2002) (addressing statute similar to Uniform
Probate Code section 3-803(d)(2)).
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estate following decedent's death also avoid the one-year nonclaim
period.98
Each of these three choices has practical implications. The attorney
should inform the client that if actual notice is given, in all likelihood the
creditor will timely file a claim. If the client wishes to increase the likeli-
hood of avoiding payment of the claim, then the client should not provide
any notice and wait for the one-year claim period to run.99 If the client
chooses to give actual notice to creditors and wishes to establish a claim
period not in excess of sixty days from date of the notice, publication
notice should not be given.' 0 The choice to forgo publication notice,
however, subjects unknown creditors to the one-year claims period. To
limit known creditors to the shortest time frame possible if the choice is
made to give both actual and publication notice, actual notice should be
provided at least sixty days prior to the running of the four-month period
for notice of publication."0 ' Because the Uniform Probate Code absolves
the personal representative from liability for making any of these deci-
sions, the personal representative need not consult with, or for that matter
consider the interests of, a potential beneficiary or creditor.'0 2 Because
the personal representative is often a family member and a beneficiary of
the decedent's estate, the personal representative likely will favor the
beneficiaries and not the creditors.
The time limits of nonclaim statutes clearly promote the efficient
passage of property at death. If barred, the creditor can no longer pursue
its claim as against "the personal representative, the heirs and devisees,
98 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(d)(3) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 40
(Sup .2006).
This conclusion assumes that the holding of Pope does not extend to application of
a onea ear statute of limitations.
o See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 217
(1998 
.19 See id.
102 See id. § 3-801(c) (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208 (1998). Note, however,
that in some states a personal representative may owe a duty to provide notice. In
California, a creditor can pursue a personal representative who fails to give notice if the
creditor fulfills the demanding statutory requirements. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 9053(b)
(West 2006). Also, in New York, a personal representative may incur liability if the
personal representative fails to act in good faith towards those claims of which the
personal representative has actual or constructive knowledge. See N.Y. SUR. CT. PROC.
ACT LAW § 1802 (McKinney 2006).
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and nonprobate transferees of the decedent."'' 0 3 The bar applies whether
or not an estate has been opened for administration. 1 4 In an insolvent
estate, once the time limit for presentation has passed, the personal repre-
sentative must pay presented claims based on priority among classes of
claimants and proportionate distribution within a class.'° 5
IV. COLLECTING CREDITOR CLAIMS FROM NONPROBATE
TRANSFERS
A. History of Uniform Probate Code Claims Procedures for Collecting
Nonprobate Property
While probate procedures regarding creditor claims for the most part
have changed very little in overall structure since initial enactment of the
Uniform Probate Code, the law of nonprobate transfers has changed
greatly. Originally separate procedures dealt with multiple-person bank
accounts and with security or brokerage accounts, and neither the sepa-
rate rules applicable to bank accounts nor those applicable to security
accounts set forth the process for asserting creditor claims as against
nonprobate transfers. 10 6 These separate rules treated the ability of
creditors to reach the subject property differently.0 7 In 1998, the Uniform
103 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40 (Supp.
2006) (clarifying that the bar is not only against heirs and devisees of the assets subject to
probate but that it also applies as against nonprobate transferees).
104 See id. § 3-803 cmt. (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2006).
105 See id. § 3-805 (amended 1975), 8 Part II U.L.A. 240-41 (1998). This section
directs the personal representative to pay claims in the following order:
(1) costs and expenses of administration; (2) reasonable funeral
expenses; (3) debts and taxes with preference under federal law; (4)
reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last
illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending
him; (5) debts and taxes with preference under other laws of this state;
(6) all other claims.
Id Section 3-807 further directs the personal representative to pay claims only after
"making provision for homestead, family and support allowances." Id. § 3-807(a)
(amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 257 (1998).
106 The Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act encompasses two separate free-
standing uniform acts previously promulgated: the Uniform Multiple-Person Accounts
Act, 8B U.L.A. 3-43 (2001), and the Uniform Transfers on Death Security Registration
Act, 8B U.L.A. 385-426 (2001). The Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act
amends a number of provisions of the 1989 versions of both the Uniform Multiple-
Persons Account Act and the Uniform Transfers on Death Security Registration Act.
107 The Uniform Probate Code addresses separately rights (1) to multiple-person
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Law Commission amended these rules to add a new section, addressing in
a single section, (i) the ability to satisfy claims from nonprobate trans-
ferees, including beneficiaries of bank and brokerage accounts, and (ii)
the procedures for asserting creditor claims as against nonprobate trans-
ferees.' This section appears both as section 102 of the Uniform
Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act and section 6-102 of the Uniform
Probate Code ("Section 102"), which incorporates in total the Uniform
Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, a separate, free-standing act.109
Section 102 sets forth procedures allowing creditors access to certain
nonprobate transfers at death.'10 The Prefatory Note to the addition of this
section indicates that the impetus for the addition came after a spate of
legislation in California, Florida, and Missouri, allowing for creditors to
satisfy claims from nonprobate property. The Prefatory Note also indi-
cates the amendments were made with some feelings of ambivalence, and
states:
accounts pursuant to the Uniform Multiple Person Accounts Act, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § §
6-201 to -227 (1989 version), 8 Part II U.L.A. 433-48 (2001); and (2) certain securities
subject to the Uniform Transfer on Death Securities Registration Act, UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 6-301 to -311 (1989 version), 8B U.L.A. 449-57 (2001). Former section 6-
215(a) of the Uniform Multiple Person Accounts Act indicated:
If other assets of the estate are insufficient, a transfer resulting from a
right of survivorship or POD designation under this part is not
effective against the estate of a deceased party to the extent needed to
pay claims against the estate and statutory allowances to the surviving
spouse and children.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-215(a) (prior to 1998 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 442 (1998).
In contrast, former section 6-309(b) of the Uniform Transfers on Death Securities
Registration Act indicated only: "This part does not limit the rights of creditors of security
owners against beneficiaries and other transferees under other laws of this State." UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 6-309(b) (prior to 1998 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A. 455-56 (1998). In
1998, both former sections 6-215 and 6-309(b) were removed and superceded by the rules
set forth in section 6-102 of the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, 8B U.L.A.
85-86, 114-15 (2001). This is a welcome change, if for no other reason than that it
reflects the trend for banks and brokerage houses to provide overlapping financial
services, and it is eminently reasonable that similar rules apply to both types of accounts.
108 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102 (amended 1998), 8 Part II U.L.A. 174-75
(Supp. 2006) (also codified as UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102
(amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001)).
109 Id.
110 See UNtF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 63 (2001).
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The decision to generate more creditor protection against
nonprobate transfers at death may be misguided. Some
discussants question the need for new protections for
unsecured creditors of decedents. Their skepticism is
warranted because commercial creditors, by continuing
to ignore the national trend towards streamlining probate
by cutting creditor protections, have demonstrated lack
of interest in probate law protections. Also, probate ex-
emptions are a product of probate's tradition of protect-
ing decedents' creditors that could come to be viewed as
unwanted fetters on owner control of succession if credi-
tor protection against transfers at death were to disap-
pear.
It's possible, therefore, that probate priorities for
family exemptions and creditors will be found to be in-
sufficiently rooted in current public policy to be re-invig-
orated in the setting of widespread probate avoidance.
Nonetheless, a proposal to increase the importance of
these priorities by extending them to nonprobate succes-
sion forms should stimulate meaningful discussion of the
policy issue. Also, discussion of policy in the context of
a proposal to expand a familiar UPC remedy should start
with agreement that decedents' creditors can be pro-
tected against popular forms of nonprobate transfers at
death without jeopardizing the growing popularity of
probate avoidance."'
Contrary to the comments of the Prefatory Note, creditors are interested
in assuring the ability to collect claims against a decedent's property,
whether probate or nonprobate." 2 The legislation passed in California,
Florida, and Missouri prior to the amendments to the 1998 Uniform
Probate Code also indicate such an interest in creditor protection. 113
1 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to
Uniform Probate Code by Adding Section 6-102 and Deleting Sections 6-215 and 6-
309(b) and to Make Conforming Changes in Free Standing Acts Derived from Uniform
Probate Code Article VI, Prefatory Note, http://www.law.upenn.edubllulc/upc/upc6102.
htm [hereinafter UPC Amendments] (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
112 The author has had occasion to review proposed legislation drafted by creditors'
counsel to provide more protection on a debtor's death.
113 See discussion infra Part IV.O.
WINTER 2007
HeinOnline  -- 41 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 852 2006-2007
41 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
Section 102 sets forth substantive rules subjecting certain nonprobate
transferees to liability for claims against the decedent's estate. It also sets
forth procedural rules for enforcing the liability of nonprobate trans-
ferees. As indicated in the discussion below, Section 102 reflects the
ambivalence toward protecting creditors noted in its accompanying
Prefatory Note.
B. Liability of Nonprobate Transferees
The substantive rules of Section 102 appear to address comprehen-
sively the ability of creditors to reach nonprobate transfers, but to subject
only certain nonprobate transferees to liability for claims against a dece-
dent's estate. The substantive reach of Section 102 does not necessarily
coincide with the law of other uniform acts or the restatements. It pro-
vides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a transferee of a
nonprobate transfer is subject to liability to any probate
estate of the decedent for allowed claims against dece-
dent's probate ... estate and statutory allowances to the
decedent's spouse and children to the extent the estate is
insufficient to satisfy those claims and allowances. The
liability of a nonprobate transferee may not exceed the
value of nonprobate transfers received or controlled by
that transferee.114
This language affirmatively makes certain nonprobate transferees liable
for creditor claims and quantifies the maximum liability of each
nonprobate transferee. The question becomes whether Section 102
changes existing rules as to the liability of certain nonprobate transferees.
C. Transferee of Nonprobate Transfer
Liability generally extends to "a transferee of a nonprobate trans-
fer."115 Section 102 defines "nonprobate" transfer as follows:
In this section, "nonprobate transfer" means a valid
transfer effective at death, other than a transfer of a
survivorship interest in a joint tenancy of real estate, by a
114 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(b) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001).
15 Id.
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transferor whose last domicile was in this State to the
extent that the transferor immediately before death had
power, acting alone, to prevent the transfer by revocation
or withdrawal and instead to use the property for the
benefit of the transferor or apply it to discharge claims
against the transferor's probate estate. 116
In order to determine the scope of this definition, each type of nonprobate
transfer must be analyzed separately. Once the scope of this definition is
determined, the definition can be evaluated in terms of its impact on
existing law. Common types of nonprobate transfers include trusts, pay-
on-death bank accounts, joint tenancy bank accounts, transfer-on-death
brokerage accounts, joint tenancy real estate, life insurance, and retire-
ment accounts.' 17 As indicated in the following analysis, in many in-
stances Section 102 changes the liability of nonprobate transferees,
sometimes expanding and sometimes limiting the liability, as compared
to the law as it otherwise has developed. The inconsistency in treatment
under Section 102 and other applicable law raises many issues, and in
light of those issues, such inconsistency may unnecessarily increase the
cost and time involved in resolving claims.
D. Revocable Trusts
Revocable trusts clearly fall within the Section 102 definition of
nonprobate transfers if the decedent holds the sole power to revoke the
trust. A corollary to this rule is that, to the extent the power of revocation
must be exercised in conjunction with another person, the assets of the
trust generally will not be subject to creditor claims under Section 102.118
The comments to Section 102 indicate, however, that liability under
116 Id. § 102(a) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001).
117 Section 102 specifically defines "nonprobate transfer" as it is to be used in that
section. Section 101 broadly references nonprobate transfers. In contrast, section 101
declares as nontestamentary any "nonprobate transfer on death in an insurance policy,
contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, certificated or uncertificated
security, account agreement, custodial agreement, deposit agreement, compensation plan,
pension plan, individual retirement plan, employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance, deed of
gift, marital property agreement, or other written instrument of a similar nature." Id. § 101
(amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 58 (2001).
118 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 cmt. 7, 8B U.L.A. 65
(2001) ("[T]he trustee of an irrevocable trust, or of a trust that may be revoked only by the
settlor and another person would ordinarily not be subject to this section .... ")
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Section 102 might attach regardless of whether the decedent holds the
sole power to revoke "if the trust is named as beneficiary of a nonprobate
transfer, such as of securities registered in [transfer-on-death] form."' 19
It is puzzling why the drafters of Section 102 would have drafted the
plain wording of the statute in a manner that can be easily manipulated to
avoid creditors. To avoid the reach of Section 102, the trustor simply
could require that to revoke the trust a nonadverse party must join the
trustor in making the revocation. The trust could then give the trustor the
power to replace at will the joint powerholder with another powerholder
of the trustor's own choosing. As a result, the trustor could remove and
replace the joint powerholder until the trustor found one willing to agree
with trustor that the trust should be revoked. Such a provision would be
no more than a minor inconvenience in light of the greater benefit be-
stowed by the possibility of avoiding creditor claims following death.
Section 102 also does not coincide with the law as it has developed
with regard to revocable trusts. After some initial victories by decedents'
estates, the law has become well settled that an individual may not avoid
creditors, during life or at death, by placing the individual's property in a
revocable trust.12° Unlike Section 102, the spendthrift provisions of the
Uniform Trust Code would, at the trustor's death, subject any trust assets
over which the trustor holds a joint power of revocation with a
nonadverse party to the trustor's creditors, as in the example provided in
the preceding paragraph. 21 The Uniform Trust Code defines "revocable"
as meaning "revocable by the settlor without the consent of the trustee or
a person holding an adverse interest.' ' 122 The definition of "revocable"
provided by the Uniform Trust Code is not susceptible to the same easy
avoidance as is the definition of Section 102. A joint powerholder who is
also trustee would owe fiduciary duties to the other trust beneficiaries
and thus be less likely to agree to revocation. Likewise, an adverse party
'19 Id.
120 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 535-36 (2006):
[T]raditional doctrine [provides] that a settlor who is also a
beneficiary may not use the trust as a shield against the settlor's
creditors. . . . [A] revocable trust is usually employed as a will
substitute. As such, the trust assets, following the death of the settlor,
should be subject to the settlor's debts and other charges.
See RESTATEMENT (TMRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) cmt. e (2003); see also State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
121 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505, 7C U.L.A. 534 (2006).
122 Id. § 103(14), 7C U.L.A. 414 (2006).
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would be unlikely to agree to a revocation that did not pay a portion of
the trust assets to the adverse party.
Because Section 102 does not coincide with the law as it has other-
wise developed with respect to trusts, the question becomes whether
Section 102 would trump case law or other statutory law of a state that is
contrary to the rule of Section 102. The answer is not clear. A creditor
could argue that while Section 102 might not apply, liability still remains
pursuant to case law. Also, if statutory law conflicts with the narrow
applicability of Section 102 to revocable trusts, arguably the broader
liability imposed by statute would trump Section 102. Section 102(b)
begins: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a transferee of a
nonprobate transfer is subject to liability to any probate estate.... 123
The broader liability imposed on the revocable trust by other statutes
could be viewed as falling under the exception. On the other hand, courts
could construe the exception of Section 102(b) narrowly to refer only to
those statutes excepting an asset from claims. It is also possible for the
court in such a case to apply a substance-over-form analysis to reach an
appropriate conclusion. The variety of answers to this question raise the
broader issue of whether Section 102 should be amended.
The questions raised by this incongruous treatment of revocable
trusts as between Section 102 and other case and statutory law defeats the
policy goal of probate procedures and Section 102 to provide a cost and
time efficient resolution of creditor claims against a decedent's estate.
Rather than go against the weight of authority, consideration should be
given to revising the application of Section 102 to coincide with already
developed law.
E. Irrevocable Trusts Created by Transferor
A decedent's interest in an irrevocable trust created by decedent
should not fall within the reach of Section 102 and therefore generally
should avoid liability for the claims of decedent's creditors, unless under
the trust terms decedent retained a power of withdrawal exercisable
alone. The comment to Section 102 clarifies: "While the trustee of an
irrevocable trust ... would ordinarily not be subject to this section, this
section could apply if the trust is named as a beneficiary of a nonprobate
123 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(b) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001) (emphasis added).
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transfer, such as of securities registered in [transfer-on-death] form."' 24
Thus, the assets of an irrevocable trust at the death of trustor generally
avoid claims of trustor's creditors under Section 102.
Again, application of Section 102 does not coincide with the spend-
thrift provisions of the Uniform Trust Code applicable to irrevocable
trusts created by a decedent. Section 505(a)(2) of the Uniform Trust Code
allows creditors to reach assets of an irrevocable trust up to the "maxi-
mum amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit.',
125
Unlike the other subsections of Uniform Trust Code section 505, this
subsection fails to indicate specifically whether it applies only during life
or both during life and after death. Although the vast majority of cases
addressing this situation deal with claims against irrevocable trusts during
the trustor's life, at least one case indicates that the ability of creditors to
reach trust assets during life should survive a creditor's death. 126 The
court in that case indicated:
If this trust, as to the accrued and accumulated income to
which the settlor was entitled before death could be up-
held as against this creditor's claim, it would be possible
for anyone to create a trust for his benefit, in which he
retained the right to receive and use all income during his
life, with remainder to another at the moment of death,
free from claims of creditors, and then keep large credit
accounts running and die leaving his debts unpaid, thus
cheating his creditors. 1
27
The court further stated: "In our opinion the creditors had a claim against
this trust before the death of the grantor. We cannot conceive that his
death would bar their claim; and we hold that a claim of creditors against
said property is not defeated merely by the death of the debtor.' '128 In light
124 UNF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 cmt. 7 (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 65 (2001).
125 UNiF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2), 7C U.L.A. 535 (2006).
126 See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d 856, 862 (Miss. 1967).
But see FCLT Loans, L.P. v. Estate of Bracher, 93 S.W.3d 469, 484 n.13 (Tex. App.
2002) (stating in dicta that Texas would not allow the settlor's creditor to invade an
irrevocable trust after settlor's death).
127 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 204 So. 2d at 862 (quoting, In re Camm's Estate, 172
P.2d 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)).128 Id.
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of this potential difference between the Uniform Trust Code and the
Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, consideration also should
be given to revision of Section 102 so as to be consistent with the ability
of creditors under the Uniform Trust Code to reach assets of an irrevoca-
ble trust that could have been distributed for the settlor's benefit.
Section 102, however, does coincide with the treatment of creditors
in states that have adopted legislation allowing self-settled trusts to avoid
creditor claims.1 29 Alaska and Delaware are among the states that afford
certain self-settled trusts creditor protection. Generally, the statutes of
those states protect property transferred to spendthrift trusts from creditor
claims, even though the trustee may use trust property in the trustee's
discretion for the benefit of trustor1
30
If the decedent retained a power to withdraw property from the
irrevocable trust during the decedent's life, Section 102 should subject
the property of such an irrevocable trust to creditor claims. The Section
102 definition of "nonprobate transfer" specifically includes "a valid
transfer effective at death by a transferor ... to the extent that the trans-
feror immediately before death had power, acting alone, to prevent the
transfer by.. . withdrawal and instead to use the property for the benefit
of the transferor or apply it to discharge claims against the transferor's
probate estate. 13' In the instance of a retained power to withdraw, which
is the substantive equivalent of a lifetime general power of appointment,
the spendthrift provisions of the Uniform Trust Code should lead to a
similar result, as should the provisions of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts.'32 Section 102, however, would not apply specifically to a re-
tained testamentary general power of appointment, as opposed to a life-
time power of appointment.
129 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 535-36 (2006).
130 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (LexisNexis 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3570 (2005).
131 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(a) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001).
132 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b), 7C U.L.A. 535 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. b (2003). Note, however, that upon lapse of a power of withdrawal
the UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2) treats the powerholder as settlor only to the extent the
value of the trust exceeds the greater of (i) $5,000, (ii) 5% of the trust assets or, (iii) the
gift tax annual exclusion amount.
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F. Irrevocable Trusts Created by Another
Irrevocable trusts created for the benefit of someone other than the
transferor fall outside the definition of nonprobate transfer under Section
102.133 Even if the beneficiary holds a general power of appointment, the
irrevocable trust avoids application of Section 102. The comment to
Section 102 explains:
The definition of "nonprobate transfer" . . . does not
apply to a transfer at death incident to a decedent's exer-
cise or non-exercise of a presently exercisable general
power of appointment created by another person.. .. [A]
presently exercisable general power of appointment cre-
ated by another person is commonly viewed as a provi-
sion in the trust creator's instrument designed to provide
flexibility in the estate plan rather than as a gift to the
donee. 13
4
Essentially, the interest of a nontransferor beneficiary in an irrevocable
trust escapes liability for the beneficiary's debts under Section 102.
Again, the application of Section 102 differs from the Uniform Trust
Code and may differ from the law of a state that has enacted spendthrift
provisions. The Uniform Trust Code allows certain creditors of a
beneficiary access to irrevocable trusts that provide for discretionary
distributions to the beneficiary. 135 Whether a beneficiary's creditors can
access irrevocable trust assets depends in large part on whether the trust
contains an enforceable spendthrift provision under state law. Section
102 also differs with respect to treatment of exercised general powers of
appointment held by a beneficiary. Generally, the creditors of a
beneficiary who has exercised her general power of appointment may
collect against the assets passing subject to the power. 136
133 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(a), 8B U.L.A. 64
(2001.4 Id. § 102 cmt. 3, 8B U.L.A. 64 (2001).
135 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501, 7C U.L.A. 520 (2006).
136 See In re Estate of Breault, 211 N.E.2d 424, 434 (I11. App. Ct. 1965) (implying
that unexercised powers are treated differently); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b) 7C
U.L.A. 535 (2006). Addressing a beneficiary's power of withdrawal in a trust created by
another person, Restatement (Third) of Trusts indicates:
Furthermore, assets that were subject to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment immediately preceding the donee's
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G. Pay-on-Death Accounts
Accounts held by financial institutions often permit an account owner
to pass the property held in the account at the owner's death to a named
beneficiary. These are often referred to as pay-on-death accounts,
transfer-on-death accounts, or Totten trusts. The contract with the finan-
cial institution generally controls the ability of the account owner and the
named beneficiary to access the account and to make changes to the
account terms. These contracts often allow the owner unilaterally to
change the named beneficiary. This right is the equivalent of a power of
revocation, which would cause the account to fall within the definition of
"nonprobate transfer" for purposes of Section 102.137
Prior to enactment of Section 102, the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers
on Death Act subjected bank accounts payable by beneficiary designation
on death to the claims of decedent's creditors up to the decedent's "own-
ership amount. ' The comment indicates that Section 102 expands this
principle to "transfer on death security registration agreements," and to
other similar accounts.' 39 The application of Section 102 also codifies
case law in jurisdictions that have not adopted a version of the Uniform
Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act.140
death thereafter remain subject to the satisfaction of claims against the
donee's estate, including expenses of estate administration.
A general power to appoint only by will ... does not give the
donee the equivalent of ownership of the appointive assets. Hence, it
does not enable creditors of the donee to reach the trust remainder
during the donee's lifetime. The advantages of such a power,
however, are sufficiently close to beneficial ownership when the
power becomes exercisable upon the donee's death that the appointive
assets can then be reached to satisfy creditors' claims and other
obligations of the deceased donee's estate.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. b (2003).
137 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(a) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001).
138 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-215(b) (prior to 1998 amendment), 8 Part II U.L.A.
442-43 (1998).
139 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 cmt. 2, 8B U.L.A. 64
(2001).
140 See In re LaPine, 795 N.Y.S.2d 294 (App. Div. 2005).
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H. Joint Tenancy Bank and Brokerage Accounts
As with all financial institution accounts, the account contract will
indicate whether the property transferred falls within the definition of
nonprobate transfer. The comment to Section 102 emphasizes this point
and states:
No view is expressed as to whether a survivorship inter-
est in personal or intangible property registered in two or
more names as joint tenants with right of survivorship
would come within section 102(a). The outcome might
depend on who originated the registration and whether
severance by any co-owner acting alone was possible
immediately preceding a co-owner's death. 14
1
The comment also notes that a survivor's portion of the account will not
be liable for a decedent's debts to the extent of the survivor's
contributions to the joint account. 42 The survivor will bear liability only
to the extent of the account values "gained through survival of the
decedent.' ' 143 This interpretation continues to make prior law applicable
to multiple-person accounts under the Uniform Probate Code and extends
application to brokerage and similar accounts.
I. Joint Tenancy Real Property
Specifically excluded from the definition of nonprobate transfer is "a
survivorship interest in a joint tenancy of real estate.', 144 The comment to
Section 102 outlines the law in states that have not adopted the section
and explains the choice to exclude such interests as follows:
The exclusion of "a survivorship interest in a joint ten-
ancy of real estate" from the definition of "nonprobate
transfer" of subsection (a) is contrary to the law of some
states (e.g., South Dakota) that allow an insolvent dece-
dent's creditors to reach the share the decedent could
have received prior to death by unilateral severance of
the joint tenancy. The law in most other states is to the
141 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 cmt. 5 (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 64-65 (Supp. 2006).
142 See id. § 102 cmt. 6 (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 2006).
14 3 Id.
1441d. § 102(a) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (Supp. 2006).
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contrary. By excluding real estate joint tenancies, stabil-
ity of title and ease of title examination is preserved.
Moreover, real estate joint tenancies have served for
generations to keep the share of a couple's real estate
owned by the first to die out of probate and away from
estate creditors. This familiar arrangement need not be
disturbed incident to expanding the ability of decedents'
creditors to reach newly recognized nonprobate transfers
at death. 
145
The exclusion of survivorship interests in joint tenancy real estate clari-
fies the law in a manner that preserves its treatment under the law of most
states as indicated in the comment to Section 102.
J. Life Insurance and Retirement Accounts
Absent a specific exception in Section 102, the transfer of life insur-
ance and retirement plans likely would fall within the meaning of
nonprobate transfer because the owner may change the beneficiary desig-
nation up until death.1 46 Of course, contracts govern these benefits and
may provide different terms. Section 102, however, states, "Except as
otherwise provided by statute, a transferee of a nonprobate transfer is
subject to liability .... ,1 The comment to Section 102 indicates this
exception "is designed to prevent a conflict with and to clarify that this
section does not supersede existing legislation protecting death benefits
in life insurance, retirement plans and IRAs from claims by creditors." '48
At least one court has adopted this interpretation. 49 The comment to
Section 102 clarifies that in the absence of legislation protecting life
insurance from creditor claims, "the insured's creditors would not be able
to establish a 'nonprobate transfer' . . . except to the extent of any cash
surrender value generated by premiums paid by the insured that the
insured could have obtained immediately before death."'1
50
145 Id. § 102 cmt. 5 (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 2006).
146 In the event the owner of a qualified retirement plan is married, the owner must
obtain the spouse's consent prior to changing from a joint-and-survivor annuity benefiting
the s ouse. See I.R.C. § 417(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c) (2006).
UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(b) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).148 Id. § 102 cmt. 2 (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 2006).
149 See May v. Ellis, 92 P.3d 859, 861 (Ariz. 2004).
150 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 cmt.2 (amended 1998), 8B
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Most states have enacted legislation protecting the proceeds of life
insurance paid to a beneficiary other than decedent's estate from the
claim of decedent's creditors. 5 Courts generally enforce this legislation
absent a showing of fraudulent transfer at the time premiums were
paid.'52 The exception built into Section 102, although not explicitly
referring to these exemption statutes, should ensure that its provisions do
not override the statutory exemptions for life insurance.
Retirement plans also may be protected from creditor claims by
statute. Federal law controls the ability of creditors to reach qualified
retirement plans and exempts such plans from the claims of creditors.' 53
State law will often provide statutory protection for other types of retire-
ment plans not protected by federal law." 4 The law among states varies
substantially regarding whether the state offers complete or partial pro-
tection for retirement plans. Again, the exception built into Section 102,
although not explicitly referring to the exemption of retirement benefits
from creditor claims, should result practically in an exemption consonant
with applicable federal and state law.
K. Limitations on Liability of Nonprobate Transferee
Section 102 quantifies the aggregate liability of nonprobate trans-
ferees in relation to the liability of the probate estate. Nonprobate trans-
ferees bear liability for claims against a decedent's estate only to the
U.L.A. 64 (Supp. 2006).
151 Although not an exhaustive list, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-131
(West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-453 (West 2005); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 2725
(2006); D.C. CODE § 31-4716 (LexisNexis 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-25-11 (West
2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1833 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-300 (West
2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2428 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 125
(West 2006); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-15-511 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.260
(LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-6 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-15-
115 (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3706 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. 38.2-3122 (West
2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.410 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-27
(LexisNexis 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-129 (2006).
152 See, e.g., May, 92 P.3d at 859; Portwood v. Minkler (In re Milton), 294 P.2d 412
(Wash. 1956).
153 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006); see also Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,
759 (1992).
154 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-850 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
32 la (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4915 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-1011
(2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 456.014 (West 2006);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 328 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105 (West 2006).
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extent that probate assets are insufficient to pay the claims in full.' The
personal representative of a decedent's estate must fully use any existing
probate assets before turning to nonprobate transferees for contribution.
Thus, only in the event the probate estate becomes insolvent will a
nonprobate transferee bear any liability for the claims of decedent's
creditors. This generally coincides with the result in those states that have
not adopted special rules for nonprobate transfers when the state requires
all claims to be filed as part of the probate estate.
In addition, Section 102 places a maximum limit on the amount of the
aggregate nonprobate transferee liability that an individual nonprobate
transferee will bear. It states, "The liability of a nonprobate transferee
may not exceed the value of nonprobate transfers received or controlled
by that transferee."'' 56 The comment to Section 102 outlines the manner
for determining the value of nonprobate transfers as follows: "Values are
determined . . . as of the time when the benefits are 'received or
controlled by that transferee.' This would be the date of the decedent's
death for nonprobate transfers made by means of a revocable trust, and
date of receipt for other nonprobate transfers."'57 Thus, while the
maximum liability depends on the value of the nonprobate transfers
received, the assets passing to the nonprobate transferee need not be
traced. Rather, the liability is that of the nonprobate transferee.
L. Priority of Nonprobate Transferees
The actual liability of a nonprobate transferee under Section 102
depends on priority, abatement, and apportionment rules. A decedent can
direct in a governing instrument, including a will, the apportionment of
liability for the decedent's debts among all probate and nonprobate
transferees. 158 In the event a decedent makes conflicting directions as to
15 5 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(b) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001). In addition to claims against the decedent's estate, nonprobate
transferees may bear liability for the "statutory allowances to the decedent's spouse and
children." Id. Statutory allowances generally include a family allowance, exempt property
allowance, and a homestead allowance. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401 to -405, 8 Part
I U.L.A. 139-43 (1998).
156 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(b) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001).
157 Id. § 102 cmt. 1 (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 63 (2001).
158 See id § 102(c)(1), (e) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62-63 (2001).
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apportionment, the most recent direction takes precedence over a prior
conflicting direction.'59
Absent a specific direction in a governing instrument by the dece-
dent,160 transferees of the decedent bear liability for creditor claims in the
following order of priority:
(1) the personal representative of decedent's estate, or if
property has been distributed by the personal representa-
tive prior to payment of all creditor claims, the trans-
ferees of decedent's probate estate;
1 61
(2) "the trustee of [the] trust serving as the principal
nonprobate instrument in the decedent's estate,"'' 62 or if
the trustee has distributed trust assets, the beneficiary
receiving those trust assets "becomes liable for the
amount of the trustee's liability attributable to assets
received by the beneficiary";1
63
159 See id. The comment to Section 102 explains:
By authorizing control of abatement among gifts made by various
transfers at death by the last executed instrument, the subsection
permits a simple, last-minute override of earlier directions concerning
a decedent's wishes regarding priorities among successors. Thus, a
will or trust amendment can correct or avoid liquidity and abatement
problems discovered prior to death.
Id. § 102 cmt. 10 (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 65 (2001).
160 See id. § 102(c)(1) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001).
161 See id § 102(b) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §
3-1004, 8 Part II U.L.A. 297 (1998).
162 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(c)(2) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001). This subsection raises the possibility of needing to determine which of
several trusts may be deemed to be "the principal nonprobate instrument." Id. The lack of
clear factors leads to the prospect of increased costs and time involved in requiring a court
to decide this issue.
163 Id. § 102(i)(2) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 63 (2001). The comment to Section
102 explains:
Subsection (i)(2) is designed to enable trustees handling nonprobate
transfers to distribute trust assets in accordance with trust terms if a
warning of probable estate insolvency has not been received.
Beneficiaries receiving distributions from a trustee take subject to
personal liability in the amount and priority of the trustee based on the
value distributed.
Id. § 102 cmt. 14 (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 66 (2001). The practical effect of this
provision is to make the creditor spend considerably more time and effort chasing down
the beneficiary. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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(3) "other nonprobate transferees, in proportion to the
values received.'
164
It should be noted, however, that the provisions in Section 102
directing the abatement of beneficial interests in trust raise an ambiguity
as to priority. The priority provision directs payment out of the "trust
serving as the principal nonprobate instrument" before any payment by
other nonprobate transferees.165 However, the abatement provisions direct
that the "interests of beneficiaries in all trusts incurring liabilities under
this section abate as necessary .... It is difficult to make the priority
and abatement provisions coincide because the priority provisions make
the "trust serving as the principal nonprobate instrument"'167 bear liability
before any other trusts bear liability; yet, the abatement provision abates
interests of beneficiaries in all trusts "as if all of the trust instruments
were a single will and the interests were devises under it.' '168 The
comment to Section 102 perpetuates this ambiguity by stating, "The
abatement order among classes of beneficiaries of trusts ... applies to all
trusts subject to liability to the extent of nonprobate transfers received or
administered whether or not the trust instrument is the principal
nonprobate instrument in the decedent's estate plan."' 169
The order of priority outlined by Section 102 reflects the historic
notion that claims should first be paid out of the probate estate. By
placing the trustee of the "trust serving as the principal nonprobate
instrument' ' 7° as second in priority, the statute recognizes that such trusts
today take the place of the will, as it was historically used, and take the
place of the traditional probate estate. The comment to Section 102 notes
that "the trust serving as the principal nonprobate instrument"'' may be
an irrevocable trust.'72 The comment assumes that the trustee of any such
irrevocable trust qualifies as a transferee of a nonprobate transfer. Thus,
only after the assets of the principal governing instrument directing
164 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(c)(3) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001).
165 Id. § 102(c)(2) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001).
166 Id. § 102(d) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001) (emphasis added).
167 Id.
168 Id. § 102(c)(2) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001).
169 Id. § 102 cmt. 9, 8B U.L.A. 65 (2001).
170 Id. § 102(c)(2) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001).
171 Id.
172 See id. § 102 cmt. 8, 8B U.L.A. 65 (2001).
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passage of decedent's property are exhausted do other nonprobate
transferees bear any liability. If most of decedent's assets pass pursuant to
one trust (as is often the case), and that trust is determined to be "the
principal nonprobate instrument,"' 73 the decision to make that trust bear
liability before other nonprobate transferees leads to efficiencies by
allowing creditors to focus on just one transferee-the trust serving as the
principal nonprobate instrument-rather than facing the need to track
down several nonprobate transferees in order to recover the debt owed to
them. At the same time, it does not treat all beneficiaries of a decedent
fairly because it makes some beneficiaries bear a disproportionate burden
of the creditor claims.
Of concern to estate planners is whether an apportionment clause for
debts should be provided in the same manner as for taxes. Historically,
many tax clauses and statutes apportioning taxes directed that the residu-
ary estate pay taxes. With the proliferation of nonprobate transfers, both
tax clauses and tax apportionment statutes typically have changed to an
equitable apportionment scheme. Equitable apportionment assesses tax
proportionately based on the value of each asset.'74 Equitable apportion-
ment clauses and statutes allocate the benefit of the marital and charitable
deductions to the property generating the deduction in determining the
apportionment of tax.' 75 Estate planners favor equitable apportionment
clauses because all beneficiaries are treated fairly and proportionately.
Such clauses avoid the surprise of an unknown asset passing tax free to a
person who is not a member of the family. 76 As with tax clauses, any
apportionment of debts should protect property for which a marital or
charitable estate tax deduction is claimed from bearing any portion of the
liability so as to avoid adverse federal estate tax consequences.
M. Procedural Rules for Asserting Liability Against a Nonprobate Trans-
feree
Pursuant to the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, before
a creditor may collect against a nonprobate transferee, the creditor, if
another interested person has not already done so, must first open a
173 Id.
174 See UN1F. PROBATE CODE § 3-9A-103 (amended 2003), 8 Part I1 U.L.A. 65-66
(Supp. 2006).
75 See id. § 3-9A-103(b)(2).
176 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kuralt, 68 P.3d 662 (Mont. 2003).
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probate administration and must do so in sufficient time to file a claim
before the time bar of the one-year statute of limitations that runs from
the date of decedent's death. 77 Probate administration must be opened
regardless of whether the decedent owned any assets subject to probate
because the proceeding must be initiated by presenting the claim and
giving notice to the personal representative. 178 The creditor must proceed
to have the claim determined as part of the probate administration.
If the claim remains unpaid after the creditor has established her
claim as part of the probate proceeding, Section 102 requires that the
creditor take steps to ensure a further proceeding is brought to enforce the
claims as against nonprobate transferees. The unpaid creditor must first
make a written demand on the personal representative to bring a proceed-
ing to enforce the liability as against nonprobate transferees. The personal
representative may choose to bring such a proceeding or may decline to
do so. Section 102 absolves the personal representative from any liability
provided she declines in good faith. The comment to Section 102 indi-
cates the importance of providing the personal representative a choice: "It
reflects sensitivity for the dilemma confronting a probate fiduciary who,
acting as required of a fiduciary, concludes that the costs and risks associ-
ated with a possible recovery from a nonprobate transferee outweigh the
probable advantages to the estate and its claimants."'
179
Should the personal representative decline to pursue nonprobate
transferees, the creditor may choose to do so.' 80 In that event, the creditor
would do so in the name of the decedent's estate.' 8 ' The creditor would
bear all expenses associated with bringing the action. 8 2 Although not
specifically provided for in the statute, the comment to Section 102
indicates, "Any recovery of costs should be used to reimburse the claim-
ant who bore the risk of loss for the proceeding."' 83 This process could be
177 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-803(a)(1) (amended 1997), 8 Part II U.L.A. 39-40
(Supp. 2006).
8 See UNW. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(g) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 63 (2001) ("A proceeding under this section may not be commenced unless the
personal representative of the decedent's estate has received a written demand for the
proceeding from the surviving spouse or a child, to the extent that statutory allowances are
affected, or a creditor.").
1 79Id. § 102 cmt. 12, 8B U.L.A. 66 (2001).
180 Id. § 102(g) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 63 (2001).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. § 102 cmt. 12, 8B U.L.A. 66 (2001).
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exceedingly costly if several nonprobate transferees needed to be in-
volved.
N. Evaluating the Procedural Rules of Section 102
From a policy perspective, the question becomes whether the proce-
dures provided by Section 102 for the collection of claims as against
nonprobate transferees promote a cost efficient and timely resolution of
unpaid creditor claims and passage of clear title to decedent's beneficia-
ries. Section 102 requires the resolution of claims within the probate
proceeding by requiring any proceeding against a nonprobate transferee
to be taken in the name of decedent's estate. The use of one forum to
resolve claims clearly promotes efficiency. Even greater efficiencies
could result, however, if all nonprobate transferees and creditors could be
made parties to one proceeding. Also, clarification of some of the issues
Section 102 raises could lead to greater efficiencies and fairness as
between and among beneficiaries and creditors.
Section 102 leaves some procedural questions unanswered. Among
the issues that Section 102 does not specifically address are (1) whether
the personal representative can join all potential nonprobate transferees in
one proceeding; (2) whether apportionment of liability among nonprobate
transferees other than the trustee of the "principal nonprobate instrument"
is calculated based on assets received only by those nonprobate trans-
ferees named in the proceeding or based on assets received by all poten-
tial nonprobate transferees whether or not named; and (3) whether the
creditor has sufficient ability to discover the whereabouts of all
nonprobate transferees. There also exists the broader question of whether
the probate court order can be enforced against beneficiaries and assets
located in other states.
Section 102 addresses this enforcement issue. It provides, "Upon due
notice to a nonprobate transferee, the liability imposed by this section is
enforceable in proceedings in this State, whether or not the transferee is
located in this State." '184 This statement contemplates that not all trusts
will have a situs in, nor will all beneficiaries reside in, the state where
decedent's estate is probated. The comment to Section 102 explains in
part:
184 Id. § 102(f), 8B U.L.A. 63 (2001).
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The underlying principle is that the law of a decedent's
last domicile should be controlling as to rules of public
policy that override the decedent's power to devise the
estate to anyone the decedent chooses. The principle is
implemented by subjecting donee recipients of the dece-
dent to liability under the decedent's domiciliary law,
with the belief that judgements recovered in that state
following appropriate due process notice to defendants in
other states will be accorded full faith and credit by
courts in other states should collection proceedings be
necessary. 1
85
Essentially, Section 102 relies on probate court jurisdiction and appears
to conclude that nonprobate transferees are not indispensable
parties.'86The accompanying comment also urges resolution of the choice
of law issue in favor of the law of the domiciliary probate estate on public
policy grounds. The comment recognizes the due process issues involved
185 Id. § 102 cmt. 11, 8B U.L.A. 66 (2001).
186 Probate court jurisdiction rests on in rem proceedings. The judicially created
"probate exception" to federal jurisdiction rests on the in rem nature of probate
proceedings. As stated by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Marshall, U.S. , 126 S.
Ct. 1735, 1748 (2006):
[W]hen one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second
court will not assume in rem jursdiction over the same res. Thus, the
probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or
annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent's estate; it
also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property
that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and
otherwise within federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in Marshall narrowly construed the probate court exception and
allowed federal court jurisdiction over a tortious interference with an expected gift claim.
Id. The court reviewed its earlier decision in Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), and
noted that that decision "observed that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits to
determine the rights of creditors, legatees, heirs, and other claimants against a decedent's
estate, 'so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings."'
Marshall, 126 S. Ct. at 1748. Based on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Marshall,
the pursuit of an estate's claim as against a nonprobate transferee residing in another
jursidiction may allow a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. Id. Commentators
note: "From the creditor's point of view, the federal court judgment certainly provides an
advantage over a state judgment, in that the former is easily transferred from one court to
another." A. MECHELE DICKERSON, RICHARD B. HAGEDORN & FRANK W. SMITH JR., 1
THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 6:80 (2006).
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and the need to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonprobate transferee
residing in another state before enforcement of the judgment.187 Although
it is not certain whether, if challenged, a court would enforce the probate
court order against a nonprobate transferee residing in another state,
Section 102 provides perhaps the only practical solution to this issue.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar, but not identical, enforce-
ment issue in Hanson v. Denckla.'88 In that case, the will of a testatrix
was probated in Florida, the state of her domicile at death. Before her
death, she had executed and funded a trust, naming a Delaware trust
company trustee, and had retained a power of appointment over the trust
assets. A Florida court held the trust invalid as testamentary but found it
lacked jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees, who were indispensable
parties. The Delaware court, with regard to the same matter, issued a
declaratory judgment finding the trust valid. The Supreme Court held that
the Florida court lacked jurisdiction both in rem and in personam. Its
holding was premised on the assumption that the trust assets were located
in Delaware and not in Florida.'89 With regard to in rem jurisdiction, the
Court stated:
[A] State acquires no in remjurisdiction to adjudicate the
validity of inter vivos dispositions simply because its
decision might augment an estate passing under a will
probated in its courts. If such a basis of jurisdiction were
sustained, probate courts would enjoy nationwide service
of process to adjudicate interests in property with which
neither the State nor the decedent could claim any affilia-
tion. The settlor-decedent's Florida domicile is equally
unavailing as a basis for jurisdiction over the trust assets.
For the purpose of jurisdiction in rem the maxim that
personalty has its situs at the domicile of its owner is a
fiction of limited utility. The maxim is no less suspect
when the domicile is that of a decedent. In analogous
cases, this Court has rejected the suggestion that the
187 Before full faith and credit is accorded an out-of-state judgment, the state issuing
the judgment must have jurisdiction over the defendants satisfactory under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); see also Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998).
14 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
189 See id. at 247.
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probate decree of the State where decedent was domi-
ciled has an in rem effect on personalty outside the fo-
rum State that could render it conclusive on the interests
of nonresidents over whom there was no personal juris-
diction. 90
The Supreme Court also held in personam jurisdiction did not apply
because the trustee did not have the requisite minimum contacts. 91 The
Court assumed the trustee was an indispensable party and determined
that, because the Florida court lacked jurisdiction, Delaware was not
obligated to give full faith and credit to the Florida judgment. 92 This
holding demonstrates the difficulty of asserting probate court jurisdiction
over nonprobate transferees. The analysis of the Supreme Court's holding
in Hanson raises an issue regarding whether a court may exercise
jurisdiction over nonprobate transferees pursuant to Section 102. The fact
distinguishing this case from Section 102 is that under Section 102 the
nonprobate transferees do not appear to be indispensable parties. The
enforceability of Section 102, in light of Hanson, also will likely depend
on an analysis of where the nonprobate asset at issue is located and the
extent of the particular nonprobate transferee's contacts with the state
exercising probate jurisdiction.
0. Overview of Procedures Adopted by Other States
The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Probate Code amendments re-
garding nonprobate transfers indicated that the impetus for the addition of
Section 102 came from legislation passed in Missouri, California, and
Florida.' 93 Like the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, each of
these three states requires the decedent's creditors to look for payment
first from the assets subject to probate administration. The technical
procedural rules for collection of debts from certain nonprobate transfers,
however, vary among the three States.
190 Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
191 See id. at 251. The court rejected a specific analysis of quasi in rem jursidiction
and analyzed based on in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 246 n.12. In a later case, Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court concluded that due process requires
state jurisdiction to be evaluated according to whether the requisite minimum contacts as
required for personal jurisdiction have been met regardless of whether it is in rem, quasi in
rem, or personal jurisdiction that is being asserted. Id. at 212.
192 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 255.
193 See UPCAmendments, supra note I11.
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1. Missouri Procedures
In Missouri, claims may be enforced against beneficiaries who re-
ceive "recoverable property."' 94 This term essentially includes certain
listed nonprobate transfers and other property that was "subject to satis-
faction of the decedents' debts immediately prior to the decedent's
death."' 95 The qualification focusing on whether the asset was liable for
debts immediately before death provides a simple way to eliminate the
possibility of creating any inconsistency with prior law as to whether an
asset is subject to creditor claims of decedent. Rather, the qualification
effectively references the law as it has developed with respect to a spe-
cific asset transferred on decedent's death.
The procedure for enforcing claims against recipients of recoverable
transfers in Missouri involves the commencement of an accounting. 96
The written demand for an accounting must be made within sixteen
months of the date of decedent's death, and the accounting must be
commenced within eighteen months of the date of decedent's death. If the
personal representative fails to commence an accounting within thirty
days of the demand, the creditor may do so. This gives the creditor thirty
days to proceed before the eighteen-month statute of limitations runs on
claims arising before death. These time periods work well in that, in the
event the personal representative declines to commence an accounting,
time will remain for the creditor to do so. 197
The Missouri procedure also addresses issues not contemplated by
the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act. The Missouri statute
specifically allows for other recipients of recoverable transfers to be
194 Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.300. (West Supp. 2006).
195 Id. § 461.300.10(4).
196 Id. § 461.300.10(2).
197 The staggered timing of the Missouri statute avoids a possible timing issue raised
by Section 102. Section 102 requires that the proceeding against a nonprobate transferee
"must be commenced within one year after the decedent's death, but a proceeding on
behalf of a creditor whose claim was allowed after proceedings challenging disallowance
of the claim may be commenced within 60 days of the final allowance of the claim." UNE.
NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATHACT § 102(h) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 63 (2001).
Section 102, however, does not specifically contemplate a claim allowed by the personal
representative after or just before the running of the one-year limitation period. See id. In
that case, the question becomes whether that claimant would also receive further time to
pursue the nonprobate transfer. Some courts have indicated that the claimant should be
able to pursue its claims. See, e.g., Hall v. Hartley (In re Estate of Hall), 948 P.2d 539,
541 (Colo. 1997); Peterson v. Marston, 362 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 1985).
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joined and made parties to the accounting.'98 So long as the action for
accounting is commenced prior to the eighteen-month statute of
limitations on claims, recipients of recoverable transfers may be joined
even after eighteen months.'99 In addition, the Missouri statute addresses
the ability of the creditor to discover the recipients of recoverable
transfers. It requires the personal representative to disclose to the
creditors making a demand "all material knowledge within the possession
of the personal representative reasonably relating to the identity of any
recipient of a recoverable transfer .. .""' Failure on the part of the
personal representative to divulge such knowledge tolls the eighteen-
month statute of limitations as to the undisclosed recoverable transfer.20'
This disclosure provision directly addresses one of the most difficult
hurdles faced by a creditor: discovering who holds the nonprobate
transfers. In addition, the Missouri statute acknowledges the likely
conflict of interest faced by a personal representative who wears the dual
hat of fiduciary and beneficiary. Missouri law allows the court to appoint
an "administrator ad litem" to represent the estate in any proceeding
brought to commence an accounting.20 2 In contrast to the Uniform
Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, the Missouri statute provides
answers to critical questions, and does so in a manner protective of the
creditor.
2. Florida Procedures
Florida law recognizes that the bulk of nonprobate transfers, other
than life insurance and retirement accounts (which are often unavailable
to creditors), occur through a revocable trust. The personal representative
may certify to the trustee the amount needed to pay creditor claims in
excess of available probate assets.0 3 The trust assets of any trust subject
198 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.300.4 (West Supp. 2006).
199 See id.
200 Id. § 461.300.2.
201 See id.
202 Id.
203 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.607 (West 2006):
[I]f, after providing for statutory entitlements and all devises other
than residuary devises, the assets of the decedent's estate are
insufficient to pay the expenses of the administration and obligations
of the decedent's estate, the personal representative is entitled to
payment from the trustee of a trust described in section 733.707(3), in
the amount the personal representative certifies in writing to be
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to revocation by decedent "either alone or in conjunction with any other
person" are subject to payment of claims by decedent's creditors upon
certification by the personal representative.2 4 The certification process
avoids the additional costs of a separate proceeding as required in some
other states and under Section 102, and increases the efficiency of the
probate process.
Florida also has adopted notice and time limitations favorable to the
creditor. Claims in Florida must be brought within two years of the date
of decedent's death, as opposed to the shorter one-year period adopted by
the Uniform Probate Code.2°5 If the statute of limitations has not yet run,
the personal representative also must publish notice and provide actual
notice to creditors who are reasonably ascertainable.2 °6 In comparison to
the Uniform Probate Code, these provisions are more likely to result in
the equitable payment of creditor claims.
3. California Procedures
California law sets forth creditor claims procedures in the event of
probate administration.2 7 It also provides optional creditor claims proce-
dures for the trustee of a revocable trust to follow in the event a probate
administration has not been undertaken.20 8 The option available to the
trustee to pursue creditor claims increases efficiency by providing the
opportunity to avoid the costs of probate administration. Notably, creditor
claims procedures are at the option of the fiduciary.29 The trustee bears
required to satisfy the insufficiency.
204 Id. § 733.707(3). This definition contrasts with that chosen by the Uniform
Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, which only makes the trust assets liable if the power
to revoke could be exercised by the decedent alone. See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS
ON DEATH ACT § 102(a) (amended 1998), 8B U.L.A. 62 (2001).
205 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.7 10 (West 2006).
206 See FLA. PROB. R. RULE § 5.241(a) (West 2006).
207 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 9000-9399 (West 2006).
208 See id. § 19003; see also id. §§ 19000-19403 (providing creditor procedures
applicable to revocable trusts). The trust creditor procedures may only be pursued in the
absense of a probate proceeding. If pursued, the trustee must give notice but is not liable
except when failure to give notice was in bad faith. See id § 19053(b).
209 See id. § 19008:
If there is no proceeding to administer the estate of the deceased
settlor, and if the trustee does not file a proposed notice to creditors
pursuant to Section 19003 and does not publish notice to creditors
pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 19040), then the
liability of the trust to any creditor shall be as otherwise provided by
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no duty to initiate proceedings for notice to creditors.2t ° California courts
have noted that the trustee has no duty "to prefer a claimant with an
unresolved claim against the estate to the interests of the trust's beneficia-
ries.",211 Once initiated, however, the procedure potentially requires
payment of claims from trust assets.
The California creditor claims procedures specifically state that
creditors can reach property subject to a power of revocation by decedent
at the time of death. 12 Should the trustee distribute property without
providing notice to creditors, the distributee continues to bear liability for
the claims of the decedent's estate.2 13 The statute of limitations for such
claims generally requires an action be commenced within one year of
death.214
California law now allows a creditor, whose claim was allowed as
part of the probate proceeding, to maintain an action directly to recover
fraudulently transferred assets on behalf of the estate.215 The California
Court of Appeal held that when insolvency caused a substantial creditor's
allowed claim to be only partially satisfied, the creditor had standing to
sue on behalf of the estate.21 6 In light of the personal representative's
conflict of interest in bringing the action, the court rejected an argument
that the creditor first had to make a demand on the personal representa-
tive to pursue the action. The California court noted:
When the creditor seeks to pursue the fraudulent convey-
ance claim within the probate proceeding itself, as sec-
tion 850 now permits, it not only fulfills the primary
purpose ... -to obtain the asset for the benefit of estate
creditors-but it also avoids the "complications" which
law.2 10 See id. § 19010.
211 See Arluk Med. Ctr. Indus. Group v. Dobler, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194, 201 (Ct. App.
2004).2 12 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 19001 (West 2006).
213 See id. § 19400. Note that when notice is published, the distributee may be liable
if certain conditions are met. See id. § 19401.
214 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.2 (West 2006).
215 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 850 (West 2006) (amended in 2001); Myers v. Leach, 42
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-61 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an action by a creditor to recover
property fraudulently conveyed falls within those actions that may be brought pursuant to
California Probate Code section 850).
216 See Myers, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 757-61.
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[a prior] court was concerned would be presented if cred-
itors were allowed to proceed individually." 7
4. States Without Specific Procedures
Many states have not adopted clear procedures addressing the ability
of creditors to satisfy a decedent's claims from nonprobate property. In
those states, creditors have pursued different approaches. Some attack
nonprobate transfers as fraudulent conveyances and petition for the
transferred property to be brought back into the estate and made available
for creditor claims." 's This action may be pursued in the form of a
creditor's bill.2" 9 Generally, the creditor must have presented a timely
claim as against the decedent's estate in order to prevail.22° Without a
timely presented claim allowed by the personal representative, the
creditor does not have a "judgment" that the creditor may enforce.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF PROCEDURES ALLOWING
DECEDENT'S CREDITORS TO ENFORCE CLAIMS AGAINST
NONPROBATE ASSETS
A. Basis of the Need for Further Reform
The policies that historically have formed the basis for probate
procedures addressing creditor claims apply with equal force to the
transfer of decedent's property outside of probate by nonprobate transfer.
The procedures for collection of creditor claims as against nonprobate
transferees should promote the policy of transferring clear and settled
title to the nonprobate transferee in a timely and cost efficient manner. As
a corollary, the rules should provide a method for timely and cost
efficient payment of debts owed by decedent to the extent nonprobate
assets by law are subject to a decedent's debts. The procedures should
217 Id. at 759.
218 See Zok v. Estate of Collins, 84 P.3d 1005 (Alaska 2004) (demonstrating the
difficulty faced by creditors asserting claims against assets asserted to be fraudulently
conveyed); First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Schwab, 194 So. 307 (Fla. 1940)
(asserting transfer to trust was fraudulent); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 9653(a)(1) (West
2006) (allowing a creditor to commence an action for recovery of fraudulently conveyed
property when estate was insolvent).
219 See First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Love, 167 So. 703, 705 (Ala. 1936); Rupp
v. Kahn, 55 Cal. Rptr. 108 (Ct. App. 1966); see 21 Am. JUR. 2D Creditors' Bills § 32
(1998 e5ISee Love, 167 So. 703; Rupp, 55 Cal. Rptr. 108.
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also promote the policy of encouraging debtors to pay existing debts to
the extent of available assets subject to those debts. This policy provides
the underpinnings of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, as indicated
by the Uniform Law Commissioner's summary, which, after discussing
secured creditors, states:
A less clear category, but important to the mainte-
nance of credit, is that of the unsecured creditor-debtor
relationship in which the debtor manipulates property to
defeat the creditor's interest solely for that purpose and
for no other. Perhaps the debtor foresees insolvency and
tries to conceal property that a creditor might use to sat-
isfy the debt. Perhaps the debtor never intends to satisfy
the debt and manipulates property to make himself
judgment-proof. Should the creditor be without recourse,
and should the debtor's rights to deal with property be
unrestricted in these kinds of cases?
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws ... proposed the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act ... in 1918 as an answer to that ques-
tion ....
In 1984, this 1918 Act was revised and renamed the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The intent of
the UFTA is the same . . . -it classifies a category of
transfers as fraudulent to creditors and provides creditors
with a remedy for such transfers. The fundamental rem-
edy is the recovery of the property for the creditor.2 '
Modem bankruptcy rules reflect this policy,2 ' as do historic probate
procedures requiring the personal representative to give priority to pay-
ment of creditors before making distributions to a decedent's beneficia-
ries. Creditor procedures for recovery of a decedent's debts from
nonprobate transfers should heed this policy and discourage debtors from
221 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Summary,
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, http://www.nccusl.org/update/unifornactsummaries/
uniformacts-s-ufta.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
222 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1402, 119 Stat. 23, 214 (2005).
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manipulating or making property difficult for creditors to find for the sole
purpose of defeating the creditor's rights.
The amendments to the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform
Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act as discussed above tend to favor a
decedent's beneficiaries. The Prefatory Note to the uniform law amend-
ments adding Section 102 expresses an inclination to favor beneficiaries:
The decision to generate more creditor protection against
nonprobate transfers at death may be misguided. Some
discussants question the need for new protections for
unsecured creditors of the decedents. Their skepticism is
warranted because commercial creditors, by continuing
to ignore the national trend towards streamlining probate
by cutting creditor protections, have demonstrated lack
of interest in probate law protections.223
The recent amendments to the Uniform Probate Code and the Uni-
form Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act favor the decedent's probate
and nonprobate beneficiaries by (1) allowing the fiduciary to avoid
providing notice to creditors and, as a result, conceal the whereabouts of
assets; (2) setting forth a relatively short limitations period within which
creditors must assert claims; and (3) in some cases, requiring more than
one proceeding to collect against nonprobate transferees. The amend-
ments also cause some confusion regarding the types of assets that are
subject to creditor claims. For states whose legislatures wish to preserve
some ability on the part of beneficiaries to take steps for the purpose of
avoiding payment of creditor claims, the recent amendments to these
uniform acts serve this goal, and arguably still meet basic due process
requirements.
The strong policy favoring payment of creditor claims when assets
exist, however, supports the adoption of timely and efficient procedures
for collection of a decedent's debts as against nonprobate transferees.
The suggested reforms set forth below attempt to balance fairly the
interests of both creditors and beneficiaries with respect to the passage of
probate and nonprobate transfers at death. They encourage the giving of
notice and the disclosure of nonprobate transfers, and promote greater
unification of claims procedures in an effort to increase cost and time
efficiencies. They also suggest clarification of certain procedures to
223 See UPC Amendments, supra note I 11.
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conserve judicial resources. The suggested reforms serve the policy of
encouraging timely payment of debts, and attempt to do so without de-
creasing efficiency in estate administration.
B. Need for Clear Information Regarding Notice of Administration of
Decedent's Assets
As evidenced by the examples in Part II of this Article, the greatest
hurdle a creditor faces is the cost involved in determining who controls
the decedent's assets. The simple answer should be the personal represen-
tative of the decedent's estate. In reality, however, probate administration
often is never opened, and thus, personal representatives are never ap-
pointed. It is more common for a trustee of decedent's revocable trust to
control the decedent's property prior to death. At times, the creditor's
search for a decedent's assets resembles a game of hide-the-ball, with the
trustee distributing assets before being notified of any judgement on the
creditor's claim, as was the case in Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center
Industrial Group.224 In that case, the trustee of decedent's revocable trust
was able to evade creditors by transferring assets to beneficiaries prior to
a judgment being issued in the probate court.2 5 In order to restrict the
ability of nonprobate transferees to increase unduly the cost of collection
and the time involved by making transfers that require yet another action
on the part of the creditor, reforms should allow the creditor claims
process to occur initially in the hands of the fiduciary with primary
control over most of decedent's assets at death.
In many estate plans, the revocable trust has replaced the will as the
principal method of transferring assets. For estates too small to justify the
drafting of a revocable trust, beneficiary designations on bank and bro-
kerage accounts and joint tenancy arrangements serve to transfer assets in
lieu of a will. This tendency to avoid probate proceedings results in a lack
of any public record regarding who controls and receives the decedent's
assets other than real property. The lack of any public record as to the
administration of assets subject to claims makes it exceedingly difficult
for the unsecured creditor to discover the whereabouts and ownership of
nonprobate transfers.
224 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478 (Ct. App. 2001), aff'd, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194 (Ct. App.
2004). 25See id. at 479-80.
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One possibility for remedying this lack of public record is to require
the trustee, or other person who has principal responsibility for the ad-
ministration of the assets subject to creditor claims following decedent's
death, to register or, in effect, to file public notice. The concept of trust
registration initially appeared in the Uniform Probate Code.226 Requiring
registration, however, defeats one of the principal advantages of using
nonprobate transfers at death. One of the primary reasons cited for using
a revocable trust or other nonprobate transfer is the privacy afforded to
the client. In addition, as a practical matter, enforcing registration would
be difficult in light of the ability to move the trust situs and the mobility
of individual nonprobate transferees. Given this mobility, a registration
requirement would need to be made uniform among the states for it to
work effectively. For these reasons, legislative reforms should reject the
option of registration in favor of options that maintain privacy with
regard to nonprobate transfers.
A better option is to require actual notice to reasonably ascertainble
creditors by the person principally responsible for administering the
assets passing as a result of decedent's death and subject to creditor
claims. The Supreme Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Services v.
Pope227 found that in order for a two-month nonclaim period to be effec-
tive to bar claims, due process requires that the personal representative
provide actual notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors. The Supreme
Court balanced the interests of the state and creditors and found the costs
of actual notice to be reasonable.22 A requirement of giving actual notice
to reasonably ascertainable creditors does not unduly intrude on the
privacy concerns of decedent or decedent's beneficiaries, and it fulfills
any due process requirements. It also promotes the policy of ensuring
prompt and efficient payment of debts by giving the creditor sufficient
opportunity to present its claim.
Any legislative reform in this regard could require the personal
representative, if one is appointed, to provide such actual notice.229 In the
absence of a personal representative, "the trustee of the trust serving as
226 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-101 (amended 1993), 8 Part II U.L.A. 486 (1998).
227 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
228 See id. at 490.
229 To accomplish this objective, Uniform Probate Code section 3-801(b) would need
to be changed so that the personal representative "shall" give notice to "reasonably
ascertainable" creditors. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-801(b) (amended 1989), 8 Part
II U.L.A. 208 (1998).
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the principal nonprobate instrument" could be required to provide such
230notice. Similar to what is done in California, any such requirement
placed on the fiduciary could be made subject to a "good faith"
standard."' A good faith standard preserves judicial resources by
providing a reasonable amount of latitude to the fiduciary to make
decisions regarding notice so that disgruntled beneficiaries and creditors
cannot unduly complain. The Supreme Court's statement in Pope, which
requires that provision of actual notice be given to reasonably
ascertainable creditors and which does not require "impracticable and
extended searches," also protects fiduciaries.232 Upon provision of actual
notice, the time period for filing any claim may be shortened to sixty
days. 233 In addition, a longer one-year statute of limitations could run to
avoid the necessity of publication notice for the benefit of unknown
creditors. Following the sixty-day notice period to reasonably
ascertainable creditors, the court could allow the fiduciary to distribute
assets without further personal liability.
In the event a revocable trust serves as the principal instrument
transferring decedent's assets, consideration should be given to requiring
the creditor claims procedure to proceed as part of the trust
administration, similar to the manner allowed in California. 4 Allowing
the creditor claims procedure to proceed as part of the trust
administration eliminates any due process concerns regarding the ability
230 UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(c)(2) (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62 (2001). The reference to "trustee of a trust serving as the principal nonprobate
instrument" borrows from the reference in Section 102 making such trustee liable for any
insufficiency of the estate to pay debts.
231 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 19053(b) (West 2006). Under California law, once a
trustee chooses to initiate creditor claims procedures, the trustee "shall" give notice to
creditors. See id. § 19050. However, pursuant to California Probate Code section 19053,
the trustee cannot be held liable unless its failure to give notice was done in "bad faith."
The creditor must also show that neither the creditor nor the creditor's attorney had
knowledge of the probate proceedings sooner than one year after publication of the first
notice to creditors and that the creditor took specified steps within sixteen months after the
first publication. This section also expressly relieves the trustee of any duty to search for
creditors. See id.
232 Pope, 485 U.S. at 490 (quoting Mallane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 318 (1950)).
233 In Pope, the Supreme Court indicated that with actual notice to reasonably
ascertainable creditors a two-month nonclaim period would meet the requirements of due
process. See id. at 490-91.
234 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 19050-19402 (West 2006).
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to obtain personal jurisdiction over the trustee, who likely holds the bulk
of assets subject to claims. As demonstrated in Hanson v. Denckla,235
when the domicile of decedent and the situs of the trust differ, it may be
difficult to assert jurisdiction over the trust in the state of decedent's
domicile. Allowing the creditor claims procedure to proceed as part of the
trust administration also eliminates an often unnecessary probate
proceeding and thereby avoids the dual cascading procedures that made it
so difficult for the creditor to collect in the examples set forth in Part II of
this Article.236
The drawback for the trust and the beneficiaries is the additional time
involved in providing an extended, but short, period within which
reasonably ascertainable creditors may file claims upon receipt of actual
notice. On balance, an additional sixty-day time period, like the one now
provided under the Uniform Probate Code, does not unduly lengthen the
time for administration of the trust and passage of clear title to beneficia-
ries of the trust property, and it does much to promote timely payment of
creditor claims.2 37 Also, reforms should dispense with the need for actual
notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors and formal presentation of a
claim upon voluntary payment of all outstanding bills of reasonably
ascertainable creditors by the fiduciary. Any creditor dissatisfied with the
lack of notice should bear the burden of proving that the creditor was
reasonably ascertainable and that the trustee acted in bad faith in failing
to provide notice or, alternatively, pay its bill.
At the same time that these suggested reforms encourage payment of
creditor claims, they preserve efficiency in the administration of dece-
dents' estates by triggering notice to creditors only in the event the fidu-
ciary decides it is inappropriate to pay a claim without requiring formal
presentation, or in the event of insolvency. The reforms also eliminate the
need for the personal representative to pursue the trustee in a second
hearing, thereby promoting unification of creditor claim procedures.
If probate administration has been initiated or if, in the absence of
any proceedings, the creditor chooses to initiate such procedures, the
resolution of creditor claims should then remain with the probate court
235 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
236 See supra text accompanying note 8.
237 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-801(b) (amended 1989), 8 Part II U.L.A. 208
(1998) (stating that upon actual notice a creditor has "sixty days after the mailing or other
delivery of the notice" to file its claim or be forever barred).
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and proceed through the personal representative. The personal representa-
tive would need to take further action to pursue nonprobate transferees.
Pursuant to the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, the per-
sonal representative may do so on the grounds that, by law, the
nonprobate assets remain liable for the debts of decedent.238 The personal
representative also may pursue assets on the grounds that a fraudulent
transfer occurred. The Uniform Probate Code grants the personal repre-
sentative the right to recover property transferred by a decedent "by any
means which is in law void or voidable as against [decedent's] credi-
tors., 239 Retaining the option to pursue creditors through probate adminis-
tration provides a safety net if a trustee fails to commence creditor claims
procedures appropriately or if the decedent employs other types of
nonprobate transfers.
C. Need for Additional Powers of Discovery
If insufficient assets exist in the probate or trust estate to pay all
creditors and the fiduciary declines to proceed as against other
nonprobate transferees, reforms also should provide more assistance to
creditors in discovering the whereabouts of other nonprobate transferees.
The simplest resolution of this issue would be to grant the personal
representative the power and right to require that third parties, such as
banks and brokerage companies, provide all available information regard-
ing the whereabouts of the named nonprobate beneficiaries. Unfortu-
nately, because ownership of nonprobate assets transfer immediately on
death, this seemingly simple resolution is not a viable option.24° Consider-
ation should instead be given to adding protections similar to those added
in Missouri.
In Missouri, when either the creditor or a named administrator must
pursue nonprobate transferees because the personal representative
declines to do so, the personal representative must disclose "all material
knowledge within the possession of the personal representative
238 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102 (amended 1998), 8B
U.L.A. 62-63 (2001).
239 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-710, 8 Part II U.L.A. 158 (1998). Note that this section
of the Uniform Probate Code grants the personal representative the exclusive right to
pursue fraudulent transfers, whereas Section 102 allows the creditor to proceed against the
nonprobate transferee in the name of the estate.
240 In some states, the state constitutional right to privacy protects financial privacy.
See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nev. v. Super. Ct., 542 P.2d 977, 979 (Cal. 1975).
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reasonably relating to the identity of any recipient of a recoverable
transfer. '241 Often the personal representative, or a person related to the
personal representative, is also the named beneficiary of other nonprobate
transfers. This fact scenario raises a conflict of interest and the prospect
of passive concealment. Requiring disclosure, as opposed to allowing
passive concealment, promotes the policy of encouraging the payment of
creditor claims.242 Such reforms, which could require disclosure by the
personal representative or the trustee, would make the claims procedure
more efficient and less costly for the creditor. Granting these additional
rights also has the collateral impact of more efficiently passing clear title
to those assets in excess of that needed to pay debts to the beneficiaries
so entitled.
These suggested reforms address the issues arising when decedent's
assets pass by will or by a funded revocable trust. They do not address
the difficulties faced by creditors when the bulk of decedent's assets pass
by other nonprobate transfers-as in the example outlined in Part II of
this Article in which the woman refused to provide any information to
potential creditors other than the fact of death.243 The principle advantage
of these other types of nonprobate transfers is the ability to avoid the time
and cost of procedural requirements involved in probate or trust adminis-
tration. However, to the extent the law subjects the nonprobate transfer to
the claims of decedent's creditors, the law also should prohibit the
nonprobate transferee from so easily avoiding payment.244 Any reform
241 Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.300.2 (West Supp. 2006).
242 In addition, Missouri law tolls the statute of limitations as to those assets received
by the personal representative in the event the personal representative fails to provide
information regarding recoverable transfers. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 461.300.2 (West Supp.
2006). In that event, it also makes the value of the nonprobate assets received by the
personal representative fully recoverable, as opposed to bearing a pro rata share of
liability, in an action for accounting. See id. § 461.300.4.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
244 See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT § 102(a), 8B U.L.A. 62
(2001). Comment 1 to Section 102 indicates:
This section replaces Section 6-107 of the original Code, and its 1989
sequel, 6-215 (Section 215 of this Act). To the extent a deceased
party's probate estate was insufficient, these sections made a deceased
party's interest in multiple-party accounts in financial institutions
passing outside probate liable for the deceased party's statutory
allowances and creditor claims.
Id. § 102 cmt. 1, 8B U.L.A. 63-64 (2001). Comment 2 goes on to clarify: "Section 102
replaces Section 215 with coverage designed to extend the principle of Section 215 to
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should strike a balance between the need to allow nonprobate transfers to
pass immediately. on death and the need to encourage the payment of
decedent's debts. For that reason, reforms should avoid placing
procedural requirements on the nonprobate transferee such as providing
actual notice to creditors. On the other hand, to the extent the nonprobate
transferee receives an inquiry by the creditor regarding the whereabouts
of decedent's assets, the law should require the nonprobate transferee to
provide a timely and complete answer to the creditor's inquiry.245
Reforms should also treat any attempt to conceal the whereabouts of the
asset by the nonprobate transferee as tolling the statute of limitations. 46
Tolling of the statute would discourage nonprobate transferees from not
paying outstanding debts of the decedent. Reform of this nature would
place the burden on the creditor and would not delay the transfer of
property at a decedent's death.
D. Need for All Interested Beneficiaries and Creditors to Participate in
Hearing
A single, unified hearing, if one is necessary because of the
insolvency of decedent's combined probate and trust estates, promotes
the policy of cost and time-efficient administration. Reforms should
provide for a single hearing, in which all transferees who have received
assets subject to the claims of decedent's creditors are joined as parties,
and all creditors should be notified that they must present claims.
Missouri law allows for such procedure in the form of an accounting.247
Upon initiation of an action for an accounting, Missouri law provides,
"[A]ny party to the proceeding may join and bring into the action for
accounting any other recipient of a recoverable transfer of the decedent's
transfers at death by revocable trust, [transfer-on-death] security registration agreements
and similar death benefits not insulated from decedents' creditors by other legislation." Id.
§ 102 cmt. 2, 8B U.L.A. 64 (2001).
245 Similar to this suggested reform is the provision of the Internal Revenue Code
indicating that, in the absence of the existence of a fiduciary relationship, notice of estate
tax deficiency addressed "in the name of decedent or other person subject to liability" and
mailed to the last known address suffices for purposes of a notice of deficiency. See l.R.C.
§ 62121b)(3).
Similarly regarding the assessment of estate tax, upon the filing of a false return
or the failure to file a return, the Service may assess and collect tax at any time, and the
three-year limitations period does not apply. See id. § 6501(c)(1), (3).
247 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.300 (West Supp. 2006).
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property even if the other recipient is not joined ... ,,248 Reforms can
encourage joinder of nonprobate transferees by making those joined bear
a pro rata portion of decedent's debt up to the value of the amount
received by the nonprobate transferee. The reforms could then allow a
right of reimbursement as against nonprobate transferees not joined in the
proceeding. Allowing for the possibility of a single action promotes
efficiency of administration. Keeping the interests of beneficiaries in
mind, the hearing would be triggered only if creditors with valid claims
could not be fully paid from the assets of the probate or trust estate.
E. Need to Allow Sufficient Time for Creditor to Pursue Nonprobate
Transferee
The time limitations for asserting claims by decedent's creditors also
should be sufficiently long to allow creditors a reasonable possibility of
successfully collecting claims from nonprobate transferees. With regard
to California's one-year limitations period for bringing creditor claims,
the California Court of Appeals has stated:
[T]he drafters of . . . [the] Code of Civil Procedure
section 366.2 believed the limitation period the statute
imposes serves "the strong public policies of expeditious
estate administration and security of title for distributees,
and is consistent with the concept that a creditor has
some obligation to keep informed of the status of the
debtor."
249
248 Id. § 461.300.4. Joinder of a nonprobate transferee implies the court exercises
personal jurisdiction over the transferee. In that regard, the statute states:
The recipient of any property held in trust that was subject to the
satisfaction of the decedent's debts immediately prior to the
decedent's death, and the recipient of any property held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship that was subject to the satisfaction
of the decedent's debts immediately prior to the decedent's death, are
subject to this section, but only to the extent of the decedent's
contribution to the value of the property.
Id. § 461.300.8. A plain reading of the statute implies an assertion of quasi in remjurisdiction. It is arguably necessary that assertion of such jurisdiction requires sufficient
minimum contacts on the part of the nonprobate transferee. See supra text accompanying
notes 188-92. The Missouri statute grants the probate court jurisdiction to hear the
accounting. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.300.7 (West Supp. 2006).
249 Levine v. Levine, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 261 (Ct. App. 2002).
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Thus, policy militates against the adoption of a longer statute of
limitations.
A one-year statute of limitations works well, assuming that a
reasonable chance of notice to creditors exists. As demonstrated in
example 3 discussed in Part II, however, the one-year limitation makes
debt collection exceedingly difficult when creditors are not apprised of
the debtor's death and are not provided opportunity to discover the
whereabouts of decedent's assets."' The need for expeditious settlement
of a decedent's estate supports a one-year statute of limitations, if the law
includes a corresponding requirement of actual notice to reasonably
ascertainable creditors. Absent a notice requirement, the policy
promoting payment of one's debts leads to the conclusion that a
shortened one-year limitations period does not provide ample opportunity
for creditors to complete the process currently required for collection of
claims by decedent's creditors. Reform requiring notice to reasonably
ascertainable creditors in conjunction with a one-year limitations period
strikes a necessary balance between the needs of creditors and
beneficiaries.
F. Need to Coordinate Imposition of Liability Imposed on Nonprobate
Transferees with Other Applicable Law
The law provides protection for certain types of assets from
decedent's creditors. For example, many states protect insurance
proceeds paid to beneficiaries other than decedent's estate from the
claims of decedent's creditors, as demonstrated in the example 4
highlighted in Part Hl.251 Some states also have taken steps to protect self-
settled trusts from creditors.252 As currently drafted, however, the
provisions imposing liability on nonprobate transferees under the
Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act often conflict with laws
protecting assets from claims. In order to eliminate conflicting provisions,
states could amend the provisions imposing liability to coincide
specifically with existing law addressing the ability of creditors to reach
certain assets upon death of the debtor 3.2 " A clear and consistent statutory
250 See supra text accompanying note 9; see also In re Estate of Taylor, 2002 MT
1393 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2366.
251 See supra text accompanying note 10.
252 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (LexisNexis 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3570 (2006).
253 See supra detailed analysis provided in Part III.
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imposition of liability would increase efficiency. Any changes to the
imposition of liability should respect state spendthrift rules and other
protections currently provided to creditors under state law.
G. Summary
The addition of these simple procedures and clarifications to the
Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death
Act as adopted by the various states effectively would increase the
efficiency of probate administration. By increasing the transparency of
nonprobate transfers and providing for a single hearing, both creditors
and beneficiaries would benefit from the timely resolution of outstanding
claims. These reforms promote the dual policies of the efficient passage
of title from the decedent to decedent's beneficiaries and of encouraging
timely payment of one's debts.
The suggested reforms also respect the interests of beneficiaries and
maintain the primary benefits of nonprobate transfers. Privacy as to assets
is maintained by avoiding any need for public notice and by requiring
actual notice only to reasonably ascertainable creditors. The reforms also
protect the ability to transfer title immediately and to avoid more
elaborate administration procedures by nonprobate transfer. Creditor
procedures would be triggered, if at all, only in the event of estate or trust
insolvency or in the event of other nonpayment upon informal
presentation of a bill by the creditor. The reforms would preserve and
clarify the ability to protect certain assets from creditor claims. At the
same time, creditors would have fair opportunity to learn of the need to
present outstanding claims and would be encouraged to proceed
expeditiously.
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